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 Defense against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks is one of the primary 
concerns on the Internet today. DDoS attacks are difficult to prevent because of the open, 
interconnected nature of the Internet and its underlying protocols, which can be used in several 
ways to deny service. Attackers hide their identity by using third parties such as private chat 
channels on IRC (Internet Relay Chat). They also insert false return IP address, spoofing, in a 
packet which makes it difficult for the victim to determine the packet's origin.  
 We propose three novel and realistic traceback mechanisms which offer many advantages 
over the existing schemes. All the three schemes take advantage of the Autonomous System 
topology and consider the fact that the attacker's packets may traverse through a number of 
domains under different administrative control. Most of the traceback mechanisms make wrong 
assumptions that the network details of a company under an administrative control are disclosed 
to the public. For security reasons, this is not the case most of the times. 
  The proposed schemes overcome this drawback by considering reconstruction at the inter 
and intra AS levels. Hierarchical Internet Traceback (HIT) and Simple Traceback Mechanism 
(STM) trace back to an attacker in two phases. In the first phase the attack originating 
Autonomous System is identified while in the second phase the attacker within an AS is 
identified. Both the schemes, HIT and STM, allow the victim to trace back to the attackers in a 
few seconds. Their computational overhead is very low and they scale to large distributed attacks 
with thousands of attackers. Fast Autonomous System Traceback allows complete attack path 
reconstruction with few packets.   
 We use traceroute maps of real Internet topologies CAIDA's skitter to simulate DDoS 
attacks and validate our design. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks are one among the most malicious attacks in the 
Internet today. In a DDoS attack a myriad of compromised systems attack a target, causing it to 
crash or deny service to legitimate users. DDoS attacks overwhelm the target system with data 
such that the response time is slowed down or stopped altogether [1]. In order to create the 
necessary traffic an attacker installs DoS daemons on a large number of systems (agents). These 
agents either exploit vulnerabilities present at the victim or overload the victim with inordinate 
requests. The former attack causes the victim to reboot or crash while the latter causes the victim 
to utilize some of its critical resources to handle the attack traffic and deny service to legitimate 
users. In short, DoS effect is achieved when the service requests interfere with the victim's 
operation and make it hang, crash, reboot or perform unnecessary work.  
There are two broad categories into which the defense against a DDoS attack falls: a) 
Prevention of the attack from happening b) Detecting the attack traffic and reacting to it. 
Proactive measures avert host based or network based attacks from compromising systems. 
Some of the preventive methods include keeping software patched up, ingress/egress filtering, 
source validation by using reverse turing tests, well organized networks with critical applications 
spread across several servers in different subnets, a firewall to prevent unwarranted intrusion and 
a demilitarized zone (DMZ) area for permission to outsiders.  
 Reactive measures constitute of two phases, detection and reaction. In the first phase, the 
attack is identified using signature detection schemes like Intrusion Detection System and 
Anomaly Detection. The second phase includes reactive methods such as adhering to the 
Disaster Recovery Plans of reinstalling OS and applications on compromised systems, 
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characterizing the attack traffic; filtering the malicious packets at the organization's firewall or 
informing the upper tiers of the malicious attack and blocking the packets; identifying the attack 
zone using trace back mechanism and informing the Autonomous System of the agents 
performing the attack.  
The best mitigation strategy is to stop the attack from occurring at all. However it is 
impossible that proactive measures can impede every attacker. There will always exist operating 
systems & applications with glitches and servers with limited resources to handle requests. 
Reactive measures like traceback mechanisms play a crucial role when proactive approaches fail 
to block a malicious attack. Reactive measures may be the only means to identify and shutdown 
a zombie to prevent any further damage. A victim can identify an attacker solely based on the 
source IP address field in a packet and if this field is spoofed then measures to block attack 
traffic based on source IP address fail. Traceback mechanisms have routers mark partial 
information on packets traversing towards the victim, which then utilizes this information to 
reconstruct the path, the packets have taken through the internet to traverse towards it [2]. This 
combats the problem of IP spoofing as the path to the attacker is identified. Even finding partial 
path information would be useful because attacks could be throttled at far routers. Disregarding 
the problem of finding the person responsible for the attack, if a victim is able to determine the 
path of the attacking packets in near real-time, it would be much easier to quickly stop the attack 
[3]. 
 This report, presents three novel and realistic traceback schemes namely Hierarchical IP 
Traceback (HIT), Fast Autonomous System Traceback (FAST) and Simple Traceback 
Mechanism (STM). All the approaches employ Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBRs) 
for marking as they are few in number, more powerful and have higher incentives to implement 
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traceback mechanisms when compared to normal routers. HIT reconstructs to the attacker in two 
phases, the first phase identifies the attack originating AS and second phase traces the attacker 
within an Autonomous System. In comparison with Authenticated Marking Scheme (an existing 
scheme), HIT involves lower overhead, reconstruction time, complexity and requires less 
number of packets to reconstruct to the attacker. FAST uses a node append mode of marking and 
requires a very few packets to reconstruct to the attack originating AS. This scheme is very 
efficient for attackers at large AS path lengths. Simple Traceback Mechanism can identify the 
attack originating AS in a single packet and the originating attacker in a few tens of packets. This 
scheme suffers from pollution attacks. As compared to HIT and FAST, STM has lower 
reconstruction time and computation overhead but suffers from pollution attacks.  
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This report begins with Chapter 1 on 'Literature Review' which includes sections on 
recruitment of agent networks, different types of DDoS attacks, the various toolkits used to 
launch these attacks over the years and the trend these attacks are likely to follow in future.  
Chapter 2, 'Defense Mechanisms - Preventive and Reactive' we discuss about the various defense 
mechanisms system administrators can adopt to protect their organizations against attacks. In 
Chapter 4 we give a contrast and comparison of various Tracing Technologies such as ICMP 
Traceback, IP Traceback, FMS, AMS & Pi. and discuss the general properties a traceback 
mechanism should have. In Chapters 5, 6 & 7 we give a description of the proposed schemes, 
Hierarchical Internet Traceback (HIT), Fast Internet Traceback(FAST) and Simple Traceback 
Scheme (STM) respectively. In these chapters we also present the packet marking algorithms and 
the reconstruction algorithms which can be deployed on the Internet routers and at the victim 
respectively. In these chapters we also detail on the inferences from the experimental results. In 
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Chapter 8 we describe the design of the software for the simulator. Appendices constitutes of 






















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE  REVIEW 
The consequences of DoS attacks are catastrophic. Starting from the Morris worm that 
attacked the CERT Coordination Center in late 1980s to TCP/IP SYN flood attack in 1996, DoS 
programs have brought the Internet to its knees. Revenue, productivity, site performance are 
highly deteriorated and increased IT expenses only add to the mounting burden. Distributed 
computing and access to increased bandwidth have increased the level of sophistication causing 
DoS attack to be more powerful. The year 1999 witnessed the first large scale distributed attack 
(DDoS) against the IRC server at University of Minnesota [4]. The attack toolkits automate 
almost all the processes allowing the DDoS attacks to compromise nodes at an exponential rate 
and thus trigger large scale attacks. Trinoo, Tribal Flood Network and Stacheldraht were marked 
as the weapons of choice for DDoS attacks [4]. The motive behind DDoS attacks is only 
degrading to highest levels of unlawfulness. Attacks ranged from identifying loopholes and 
crashing a few systems for fun and bringing down the business of companies to stealing personal 
information of people. In March 2005, hackers hit California State University gaining personal 
information including names and social security numbers of 59,000 people affiliated with it. 
Earlier in the same year DSW shoe warehouse acknowledged stolen credit information from 
more than a hundred of its stores [5]. These attacks could get more lethal in conjunction with 
cyber terrorism, the use of computing resources to intimidate or coerce others.  An example 
cyber terrorism could be hacking into a hospital computer system and changing someone's 
medicine prescription to a lethal dosage as an act of revenge [44]. Cyber terrorism could also be 
the next mode of revenge, terrorists can resort after the 9/11 attack. This only shows that attacks 
are getting very powerful and dangerous and that people have to take the necessary precautions.  
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2.1 Recruitment of Agent Network 
Having understood the varied nature of DDoS attacks it would be useful to be aware of 
the whole process of a DDoS attack right from the recruitment of an agent network to the 
different tools used to wage an attack, the scale of an attack and the last but not the least defense 
mechanisms to fend off attackers. The following paragraph describes the process of recruitment 
of an agent network.   
Depending on the scale and type of attack, the attacker intends to initiate, he searches for 
vulnerable hosts (hosts with high network bandwidth and poor administration), manually, semi-
automatically or automatically, in a process known as scanning. Once the vulnerable nodes are 
identified DoS daemons are installed on these systems. Earlier it was the installation process that 
was automated, but now there are scripts to automate the search for vulnerable hosts and 
installation of attack code. Examples of automated scanning tools are sscan, bots and worms. 
The various stages of the DDoS attack model as shown in Figure 2.1. The program 




Figure 2.1 DDoS Attack Model 
 
  Attacker 
  Communication Channel 
  Victim 
Attacking hosts 
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The communication channel can be a single host (IRC server) or a set of hosts 
(Handlers). The communication channel is a means for the infected hosts to declare themselves, 
to provide an indirect way of communication with the attacker [7]. The IRC model and Agent 
Handler model are examples of DDoS attack models with different communication channels. 
In the IRC model, Figure 2.2, the communication channel is an IRC server or a set of IRC 
servers. This model uses bot as the automated scanning tools. A bot is a program on a 
compromised host, watching for encoded commands, like scanning a block of addresses or 
inviting a person to the IRC channel, to execute on the IRC channel. Once the bot obtains a set of 
vulnerable hosts they inform the attacker using botnet. The attacker creates a list of vulnerable 
hosts from the set addresses obtained from all the bots. The attacker then establishes 
communication channels between machines using IRC-based command to achieve an attack. 
 
Figure 2.2 IRC Model 
 
 
  Attacker 
  BOT  BOT 
  Host     Host   Host     Host   Host   Host 
  Victim 
  IRC Server   IRC Server 
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Thousands of people connect to an IRC server and form thousands of different chat channels. It 
is impossible to identify the attack channel in such a huge number of channels and therefore the 
identity of the attacker is left unknown [7]. 
In the Agent Handler, Figure 2.3, the communication channel consists of one or more 
hosts (handlers) that the attacker has compromised. The attacker issues commands to handler 
which inturn dispatches commands to the agent to launch an attack against the victim. 
 
Figure 2.3 A Handler/Agent Control Structure 
 
Like bots, worms are also automated client programs that propagate from one vulnerable 
host to another. Worms scan for vulnerable machines, exploit the compromised machines by 
installing the attack code and execute a code (called payload) to achieve an attack. Worms spread 
extremely fast because of parallel propagation pattern. The infected machines and the worm 
copies swarming the internet, grow exponentially [8]. 
 
  Attacker 
  Handler   Handler 
  Agent   Agent Agent   Agent  Agent   Agent 
  Victim 
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2.2  Types of Attacks 
The ultimate motive of a DDoS attack is to incapacitate a system's ability to process 
requests for its legitimate users. The various forms of attack are as follows: 
2.2.1  Attack of Application 
Every application can handle a certain number of requests per second. Attackers target a 
specific application and send packets such that this limit is reached. If the number of packets sent 
to the victim is more than its request acceptance rate the server can be overloaded causing it to 
hang or crash. This causes a denial of service to legitimate users.  
Heavy provisioning, in the form of ample server and network capacity, can protect 
against application attack but can't guarantee immunity. Reacting to this kind of an attack by 
directing the traffic to a black hole or a sink hole might prevent the host from crashing but it 
doesn't rule out the possibility of denying service to legitimate users. There are not many 
defenses that can protect a victim against this attack. Reactive schemes such as traceback 
mechanisms can help identify the attack originating system and have it shut down. 
2.2.2  Attack of Protocol 
There are many vulnerabilities that exist in protocols. Attackers make use of these 
loopholes to launch a DDoS attack. One such vulnerability is with the transport layer protocol - 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). This protocol is responsible for the reliable transmission 
of packets between end systems. Any application that runs on a TCP protocol synchronizes 
session parameters between the server and client in 3 phases as shown in Figure 2.4 [9]. In the 
first phase the client sends a TCP/SYN packet requesting a service, to the server. In the SYN 
packet header the client provides a unique per connection number and a sequence number that 
keeps track of the amount and order of the data, sent by the client. Once the server receives the 
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SYN packet it allocates a TCB, transmission control block, storing information about the client. 
The server then sends a SYN ACK packet acknowledging the client of the service request it 
received and granting the service it requested. The packet header of the SYN ACK packet 
contains the server's initial sequence number. The client allocates a TCB and completes the 





Figure 2.4 Opening of TCP connection: Three-way Handshake 
 
The vulnerability an attacker exploits here is the allocation of TCB by the server before 
the client commits any of its resources. Figure 2.5 shows the handshake between the server and 
client, when the server is under an attack. If the server doesn't receive any ACK packet from the 
client it closes the connection after timeout expires. The resources of the server are tied up till it 
receives an ACK packet from the client. If the attacker identifies an open port and sends small 
number of requests with spoofed addresses before the timeout expires, the server will wait for 
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ACK from the spoofed clients and allocate memory for each of its spoofed clients [6]. In the 
process the victim exhausts its memory and crashes hence denying service to legitimate users. In 
another version of TCP SYN flooding the attacker can send enormous packets to random ports 
rendering the network resources useless rather than the buffer space.  
 
Figure 2.5 Handshake under an Attack 
 
Protocol attacks target the asymmetry inherent in certain protocols by requiring the server 
to allocate its resources while sparing the client of its resources. Change in protocol 
specifications can be a solution but this will require all the systems to change their settings. 
Therefore, this doesn't seem like a feasible solution. The other solutions would be to create 
protocol patches that balance the asymmetry by requiring the clients to provide a proof of work 
or resource allocation through TCP SYN cookies and RST cookies, allocate micro blocks instead 
of the complete connection block for the client [9]. 
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2.2.3  Attack of Resources 
   An attacker targets resources like the CPU cycles, computing power, router switching 
capacity & infrastructure to launch a DDoS attack. Requests, which involve huge mathematical 
calculations or vulnerable hash functions, require more CPU cycles as compared to the ordinary 
applications. A few requests can overwhelm the server rendering it incapable of processing 
legitimate requests. Many types of DDoS attacks are more or less overlapping. For example this 
attack can also fall in the attack of application category. 
Router switching capacity is another resource attack, which targets at increasing the size 
of the routing tables with unimportant data and at times it leaves no room for critical entries. The 
router has to parse more information to forward packets to their destination. This causes delays 
in packet forwarding and sometimes packets get dropped before reaching their destination. The 
performance of routers is adversely affected due to such attacks.  
Attack of infrastructure resources, exploits the network design of an organization. In a 
poorly designed network all the servers belong to the same sub network and an attack targeting 
routers,  handling the subnet can easily cripple all the servers in that subnet. Proper design of the 
network, redundancy of information (backup servers & geographically distributed servers) and 
paths can be a solution. 
2.2.4  Exploiting a Vulnerability 
Attackers exploit vulnerabilities at the victim with well crafted packets. An improper 
handling of these packets disrupts the proper functioning of the victim. A well known 
vulnerability attack, Tear drop attack, exploits the markings in the fragmentation field of the IP 
header. When a router receives an IP packet that is too large for the network to which the packet 
is being forwarded, IP fragments the packet into smaller size packets to accommodate in the 
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network. At the receiving end the packets are reassembled into the original payload. The packet 
header has a fragmentation field, which keeps track of the order of the fragmented packets. If this 
field is manipulated for any two fragmented packets, reassembly of the packets at the victim 
causes a hang or crash of the system. Different versions of this attack exist with the fragments 
that indicate small overlap, a negative offset and different padding size or larger offset than the 
size of the IP header leading to the attacks Teardrop, bonk, boink and newtear[10]. 
For applications which run on TCP, a reliable protocol, which can discard the packet and 
request for the packet to be resent, will have a patch for this loophole but applications which run 
on unreliable protocols like UPD are still open to exploit.  
In SSping attack, a variant of "Ping of Death" attack, a packet size greater than 65536 
octets (Maximum size of a TCP/IP packet) sent to a victim will force it to halt. Land attack is 
another example of vulnerability attack exploiting the sources and destination address fields in 
an IP packet [10]. Unlike flooding attacks, vulnerability attacks become ineffective once a patch 
for these attacks has been developed. 
2.2.5  Pure Flooding 
In this attack, the intruder floods the victim with inordinate service requests. A multitude 
of illegitimate requests can consume many of the critical resources at the victim, rendering the 
victim incapable of processing legitimate requests. 
As such there are no preventive measures against this attack. Reactive measures at the 
victim include detection and characterization of the attack traffic followed by contacting the ISP 
to filter, rate limit and direct the traffic to a black hole or sink hole. In the process of filtering 
packets which saves the ISP's and victim's resources the requests sent from legitimate users can 
also be denied and the motive of the flood attack is accomplished. 
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As most applications run on TCP traffic, UDP traffic can be filtered reducing the 
possibility of resources utilization by the UDP traffic. Smurf & Fraggle are two other flooding 
attacks, which use IP spoofing to swamp the network bandwidth. This type of an attack 
constitutes of three parties, the attacker, the intermediary (the broadcast address to which packets 
are sent) and the victim (the spoofed IP address). An attacker sends ICMP echo requests traffic 
to the intermediary address using a spoofed source address of a victim. This causes every 
machine on the broadcast network to receive the reply and respond back to the source address 
that was forged by the attacker [27]. The attacker can spoof a set of IPs and cause the 
intermediary systems to respond to the request causing the network to be swamped. Because the 
source address on the packets was forged, all the replies go back to the source address that was 
specified, which now becomes the victim’s machine.   
2.3  Attack Toolkits 
An attack toolkit is a tool used to launch DDoS attacks using the above mentioned 
methods. It is a piece of code that is built into an easily usable package for launching attacks. 
Some attackers are sophisticated to originate their own attack code while most of them use 
existing codes. Moreover attackers write scripts to automate the installation process and this 
allows unsophisticated users to become DDoS perpetrators in a short time. Automation leads to 
widespread attacks thus increasing the intensity of destruction caused.  
Early DoS attack technology involved simple tools that generated and sent packets from a 
single source aimed at a single destination. Over time, tools evolved to execute single source 
attacks against multiple targets, multiple source attacks against single targets, and multiple 
source attacks against multiple targets [10]. 
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There exists a constant race between the attackers and the defenders. As soon as 
defenders come up with defense mechanisms, attackers find ways to bypass these defenses. 
Advanced toolkits are emerging to support the motivation behind every DDoS attack. Over the 
years attacks ranged from large scale UDP, TCP flooding with tools like Trinoo, Stacheldraht & 
Tribal Flood Network to financially motivated attacks with tools like Agobot and Phabot. 
The trend of attack strategies is becoming more and more daunting as the sophistication 
of the tools being employed is scaling upwards. Table 2.1 gives a chronological order of the 
main tools and their attack methods. 
Table 2.1 DDoS Tools and Flooding or Attack Methods 
 
TOOLS FLOODING OR ATTACK METHOD 
Trin00 UDP 
Tribal Flood Network UDP, ICMP, SYN, Smurf 
Stacheldracht and Varients UDP, ICMP, SYN, Smurf 
TFN 2K UDP, ICMP, SYN, Smurf 
Shaft UDP, ICMP, SYN, Combo 
MStream Stream(ACK) 
Trinity, Trinity V3 UDP,SYN,RST, Random Flag, ACK, Fragment 
Phabot,Agobot UPD, ICMP, Targa, 
 
The following sections give a brief overview of the trends associated with the popular 
DDoS attacks. 
2.3.1  Trin00  
 Trin00 was one of the prominent tools used to attack against the IRC server at University 
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of Minnesota in November, 1999. With IRC clients all over the globe to launch coordinated UDP 
flood denial of service attacks, all the resources got locked up and service was denied to all the 
legitimate users for days. The University counted around 2,500 attacking hosts, and that was an 
underestimate as the logs were not able to keep up with the attack [11].  
Trinoo uses handler/agent architecture, with Trinoo residing in the agents and the handler 
commanding the agents to launch the attack. The following are the ports used for Trinoo attack.   
Attacker - Handler destination port 27665/tcp 
 
Handler - Agent destination port 27444/udp 
 
Agent - Victims randomized destination ports 
 
Agent - Handler destination port 31335/udp 
 
   All the communications with handler on port 27665/tcp require a password and all those 
 
 on port 274444/udp require the UDP packets to contain the string "l44". The source address of  
 
trin00 packets is not spoofed; therefore finding the agent is not hard except that there will be  
 
many of them [12].  
 
2.3.2  Tribe Flood Network (TFN) 
TFN uses a similar handler/agent model as in trin00. TFN uses ICMP (Internet Control 
Message Protocol) echo reply packets with 16 bit binary values embedded in the ID field, and 
any arguments embedded in the data portion of the packet. The binary values, which are 
definable at compile time represent instructions between the handler and agent. The instructions 
when decoded can support several denials of service attacks like SYN floods, UDP floods, ICMP 
floods, and smurfing. For example the code 345 represents SYN flood attack. The TFN runs at 
the root therefore the source address can be spoofed making identification of the attackers even 
harder [12], [13].    
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2.3.3  Tribe Flood Network 2000 (TFN2K) 
TFN2K appeared in December 1999 and was an improved version of the TFN attack tool. 
It includes a strong encryption (CAST-256) algorithm for control packets. TFN2K was designed 
to be compatible with almost all the operating systems including Linux, Solaris, Unix & 
Windows [14]. The communication between the handler and agent is done on randomly chosen 
protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP) so that no recognizable pattern can be obtained. Therefore the 
packets pass through most of the filtering mechanisms. The communication is one way with no 
acknowledgments sent back to the handler by the TFK2N agent leaving no trace of the handler. 
The handler sends around 20 commands assuming atleast one command would have been 
received by the agent. TF2KN voids the concept on which the certain scan tools are built to 
identify the handler as the executables are stored as binaries in the handler. The scan tools detect 
certain matching string patterns to determine an attack agent. But with binaries there is string 
pattern matching tool is lacking. In the agents the binaries are extracted to executables and the 
pattern matching strings can be found.   
In addition to flooding TFN2K can also attack by sending invalid packets, which includes 
invalid offset, protocol, packet size, header values, options, offsets, tcp segments, and routing 
flags [47]. This kind of an attack is called Targa3 attack. Enough malformed packets can cause 
the system to crash. 
2.3.4  Stacheldraht 
This attack toolkit appeared during the same time as Trinoo and TFN.  Stacheldraht 
combines the features of the two. Like TFN it can spoof the source address. It also uses 
encrypted communication between handler and agent and provides for automatic updates. With 
the update feature Stacheldraht can automatically replace agents with new versions and start
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 them. It uses TCP and ICMP on the following ports as default: 
Attacker to handler: 16660/Tcp 
Handler to and from agent: 65000/Tcp, ICMP ECHO_REPLY 
The attacks performed by Stacheldraft are UDP flood, TCP SYN flood, ICMP Echo flood and 
smurf attacks. Many strings could be used in identifying the binaries in the file system. The 
NIPC tools would be effective in discovering these agents. However, if the binaries get 
compressed, this technique will not be successful [14]. Stacheldraht is far more difficult to 
prevent as it uses ICMP protocol for its communication. Through years Stacheldraht agent came 
up with varied version known as t0rnkit toolkit and Ramen worm.  
2.3.5 Shaft 
Shaft is another attack tool that uses a combination of features similar to Trinoo, TFN, 
Stacheldraht. The shaft network is made up of one or more handler programs and a large set of 
agents, which gives the ability to switch handlers and agent ports on the fly making it difficult to 
filter packets.  The following are the ports it uses: 
Attacker to handler: 20432/tcp   
Handler to agent: 18753/udp   
Daemon to handler: 20433/udp [15]. 
Shaft uses 'ticket' mechanism for keeping track of agents. Both password and ticket 
numbers have to match for the agent to execute a request. Agents can launch UPD flood, TCP 
SYN flood & ICMP flood attack. The flood occurs in bursts of 100 packets/host (This number is 
hard coded) with the source port and address randomized. The attacker can choose the duration, 
size of the packets and type of flooding attack towards the victim. Handlers have special 
command to obtain statistics on the attack traffic generated by each agent. This allows the 
attacker to keep track of the yield generated by the DDoS attack [16]. 
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2.3.6   Mstream  
Mstream is another attack tool which is less sophisticated when compared with other 
tools. The source code of this attack tool was recovered in its developmental stages with 
numerous bugs. Mstream agent was discovered in April 2000 on a compromised Linux machine 
in a major university. This tool slows down the machine by using up CPU cycles and eats up the 
network bandwidth. It generates a flood of TCP packets with ACK bit set. Handlers can be 
controlled remotely by one or more attackers using password protected interactive login. The 
communication between all the components in the attack can be changed at compile time. The 
handler does not require root privileges, but can login as a regular user on a Unix system to 
command the agents. The agent crafts the headers for forged packets and thus requires 
administrative privileges to perform the attack. The default ports are  
Attacker to handler: 6723/tcp   
Handler to agent: 9325/udp  
Daemon to handler: 7983/udp 
 The handler expects commands to be contained entirely in the payload of the packet. 
Therefore the attacker can't use remote login like telnet to control the handlers. Like Trinoo, 
communication between handler and agent is accomplished through UDP datagrams [17]. 
2.3.7  Trinity 
Trinity is the first DDoS tool that is controlled via IRC (Internet Relay Chat). After a 
machine is compromised by a Trinity agent it joins a specified IRC channel and waits for 
commands from the handler. This facilitates for a massive flood attack against a target machine. 
Trinity is capable of launching several types of attacks including UDP, IP fragment, TCP SYN, 
TCP ACK and other floods. Presently there are eight variants of Trinity attack found on Internet 
Relay Channels [45].  
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2.3.8   Agobot 
Agobot a descendent of Phatbot was widely used in 2003 and 2004. It is a blended threat 
which can perform a varied set of attacks for which it is called "Swiss army knife".  It 
implements two types of SYN floods UPD flood and ICMP flood, the Targa flood (which 
includes random IP protocol, fragmentation and fragment offset values and spoofed source 
address),  the wonk flood (one SYN packet, followed by 1023 ACK packets) and a recursive 
HTTP GET flood. This HTTP flood is difficult to obviate by filtering because the attack traffic 
pattern resembles the normal traffic pattern [18]. 
2.4  Attack Worms  
2.4.1  Code Red 
It is a self replicating malicious code that exploits a known vulnerability, buffer overflow 
in Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) Indexing Service DLL. The worm had a world 
wide impact in summer 2001, with 359,000 machines infected in 14 hours [19]. The Code Red 
worm attempts to connect to TCP port 80 on a randomly chosen host assuming that a web server 
will be found. Upon a successful connection to port 80, the attacking host sends a crafted HTTP 
GET request to the victim, attempting to exploit a buffer overflow in the Indexing Service. 
Systems not running IIS, but with a HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) server listening on 
TCP port 80 will probably accept the HTTP request, return with an "HTTP 400 Bad Request" 
message, and potentially log this request in an access log. A packet-flooding DoS attack will be 
launched against a specific IP address embedded in the code [20]. If the exploit is successful, the 
worm begins executing on the victim host.  
Code red 2, a disruptive version of code red, preferentially probed for machines on the 
same subnet and nearby subnets. As a result, once a machine within a corporate firewall is 
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infected, it would quickly probe every machine within the firewall and infect virtually the entire 
network [21].  
2.4.2  Nimda Worm 
 The Nimda worm has the potential to affect both user workstations (clients) running 
Windows  95, 98, ME, NT, or 2000 and servers running Windows NT or 2000. End-users can get 
infected by either opening an e-mail attachment called README.EXE or by surfing on an 
infected web site, which might offer the user to download README.EXE. After the end-user 
has executed the file, the worm will continue to spread in two different ways. First it will send 
itself out via e-mails directed to addresses found from users e-mail inbox. Secondly it will start 
to scan random Internet addresses trying to locate vulnerable IIS web servers [21]. The actual 
spreading of Nimda can be split to four parts: Infecting files, Mass mailing, Web worm and LAN 
propagation as seen in Figure 2.6 
 
Figure 2.6 Spreading of  Nimda Worm 
 
           Nimda is the first worm to modify existing web sites to start offering infected files for 
download. Also it is the first worm to use normal end user machines to scan for vulnerable web 
sites. Other worms which spread at such a rapid rate were vbs.loveletter worm and the 
w32.bugbear worm. These worms took the major anti-virus manufacturers off-guard.  
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2.5   Reason Why DDoS Attacks Are so Easy to Implement  
• Dependence on Internet  
 
Internet has become a vital part of human life. Businesses like Ebay, Amazon and Netflix 
rely heavily on online transactions. Any infliction on the business servers can cause a 
huge revenue loss to such companies. Frequent attacks can damage a site's reputation and 
ward off customers and investors. Public network is the easiest & most accessible 
platform for the invaders to launch attacks to bring down any victim to its knees. 
• Availability & Simplicity 
DDoS tools are available at large and can be easily downloaded. Automation of 
processes like scanning for vulnerable hosts, installing agents and launching an attack 
allows a novice to launch flood attacks with just a few commands. Attack toolkits are 
exceedingly simple to use and some of them have been here for years. Still, they generate 
effective attacks with little or no tweaking. 
• Security Pitfalls 
Mostly, systems are connected to the internet via a public network. It is easy for attackers 
to access such machines and install vulnerability scanners. Most of these systems can be 
targeted as agents, to launch DDoS attacks because of their ineffective security measures. 
Systems should be setup for regular updates to fix patches, latest antivirus/anti-spyware 
software and a firewall to prevent unauthorized access. 
• IP Spoofing 
IP spoofing is an easy technique for attackers to hide their identity. The IP address of the 
source or destination field in the packet can be tampered, causing the victim to assume 
the origin of the attack traffic to be legitimate. An attack launched can't be traced back as 
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the origin is spoofed. The tremendous growth in the number of systems connected to the 
internet has increased utility of IP spoofing. As such prevention of IP spoofing is not 
possible but approaches like ingress filtering and egress filtering minimize DDoS attacks. 
IP spoofing coupled with varied attack patterns and multitude of machines has made 
DDoS attacks extremely powerful. 
• Multitude of Agent Machines 
With millions of computers connected to the internet and this number rising rapidly, the 
probability that the attacker finds novice internet users is high, increasing the strength of 
a DDoS attack. With so many agents, the attacker can vary his attack by deploying 
subsets of agents at a time, varying strategies or sending a few packets at a time. A few 
packets beat the concept of trace back and even if 10,000 machine identities are known, it 
is highly impossible to stop these sources. The solution would be to have secure systems 
preventing agents from being installed. With the existing internet layout, this seems too 
far a practical solution. Even if companies come up with solutions it will not be in the 
near future that systems will be impervious to attacks.   
• Limited Resources 
Every system has limited resources and the attackers target these resources by 
overwhelming them with the high-volumes traffic. CPU cycles, network bandwidth and 
power are a few of the resources that are targeted. If legitimate traffic could be discerned 
from attack traffic then controlled traffic would not swamp the limited resources. 
• Legitimate or Illegitimate Traffic  
Unlike the vulnerability attacks where the packets have to be crafted (Targa3, worms) to 
launch an attack, flooding attacks can compromise a large number of systems with 
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volumes of traffic. As this traffic behaves like legitimate traffic, the filtering process 
becomes extremely difficult.  
• Internet Topology 
The current internet topology uses a Hub & Spoke with hubs carrying large volumes of 
traffic. If these hubs are taken down by an attack there will be a devastating effect on the 
global connectivity.  
Summarizing all the aforementioned reasons we have, almost all the businesses 
rely heavily on internet. "Black hats" have an abundance of tools (easily available and 
automated) and accomplices (agents) to originate an attack and bring these companies 
down. A sufficient volume of attack with IP spoofing and a mixture of attack pattern can 
beat the filtering mechanisms and leave the victims swamped. 
2.6  DDoS Defense Hurdles  
• Distributed Response 
The challenges we are facing today is because of the vast nature of the distributed 
network. DDoS attacks utilize the distributed nature of the internet to launch an attack. 
With thousands of systems distributed all over the world to generate an attack, a response 
system to DDoS attack should be distributed and possibly coordinated. Since internet is 
administered in a distributed manner, a wide range deployment of a response system is 
highly unlikely. 
• Lack of Detailed Attack Information 
It is believed that disclosure of any DDoS attack will damage the reputation of a 
company. Therefore many occurrences of DDoS attacks are not reported. Lack of 
appropriate information prevents researchers from knowing the current trend of attacks. 
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Information like the kind of attack, the number of agents and the time for which the 
attack persisted is very crucial for developing defense mechanisms. 
• Lack of Defense System Benchmarks 
Presently there is no standardized procedure to determine the merits of any mechanism 
proposed by companies. 
2.7 Case Study of IPremier  
The following is a case study of a web-based commerce company, IPremier, which 
closed down after a DDoS attack was launched against it. A review on this case study will leave 
us with a situation which requires us to decide the appropriate defense mechanism against an 
attack. 
IPremier was a venture started by two students in 1994, in Washington, Seattle. The 
company was one of the top two retail businesses selling luxury, rare and vintage goods on web. 
It was one of the few profitable entities in the so-called "new economy". Qdata, was the 
company in charge of providing internet security services including firewall service, filtering and 
blocking packets & monitoring traffic for IPremier. In the year 2003, a DDoS attack at a rate of 
one email/sec was launched against IPremier. A SYN flood attack lasted for an hour 
incapacitating the servers all the while. Qdata was not up to date with the software patches and 
intrusion detection signatures. It also couldn't maintain a proper log of the attack packets and 
hence was not able to locate the attackers. 
With an intention to obtain the log files to trace back to the source of the attack IPremier 
left the attacked ports open for more than a week. The attacker behaved as normal traffic and 
installed an agent on the server through the port. This agent was remotely commanded to launch 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the competitors of IPremier. When the competitors 
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realized that they were being attacked by IPremeier, they believed that IPremeier had launched 
the attack as the source address of the attack packets was the IPremeier server. The competitor 
filed a case against IPremeier and had it shut down forever. A company that was at its pinnacle 
crashed for making an improper decision. It left the server ports unsecured with an urge to find 
the attacker.   
IPremeier had two options to handle the attack situation. The company adopted reactive 
measures and left its ports unsecured with an intention to traceback the attacker. It could have 
adopted preventive measures and updated its security system instead of having left loopholes for 
another attack. For obvious reasons  prevention would have been an ideal option but this is not 
always the case. Threre will always exist glitches in applications, protocols and operating 
systems which can be exploited to launch an attack 
Rate limiting, packet filtering, and tweaking software parameters can in some cases, help 
limit the impact of DoS attacks, but usually only at points where the DoS attack is consuming 
fewer resources than are available. The open, interconnected nature of the internet and its 
underlying protocols, will always have scope for exploits and there is every possibility that 
preventive measures will fail. If an attack can't be prevented, there has to be an alternate 
countermeasure, one can resort to. In many cases, the only defense is a reactive one. Reactive 
measures help to locate the systems where the agent is installed. Once the attack traffic is 
detected and characterized at the victim, reactive measures should be taken at the earliest. Higher 
tiers can be asked to block unwanted traffic and with their cooperation the source of attack traffic 
can be tracked and shut down.  
With the given explanation it is clear that an optimal mix of the preventive and reactive 
measures can be the best bet against a DDoS attack. The following chapter 'DEFENSE 
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AGAINST DDoS ATTACKS: Preventive & Reactive' gives an insight on the existing preventive 



























CHAPTER 3: DEFENSE AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS: PREVENTIVE AND 
REACTIVE 
 
There are two types of defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks: preventive and 
reactive. Preventive/Proactive approaches include all measures to avert an attack from 
happening. Reactive approaches are those procedures an organization adheres to once it 
discovers that some of its systems have been compromised [22]. Preventive and reactive 
measures are not mutually exclusive. An adequate allocation of resources for both the 
mechanisms is helpful in building a robust infrastructure for an organization.  
 Following are some preventive measures that can improve the security of systems and 
make it difficult for an attacker to channel a DDoS attack through them. It is of vital importance 
that these suggestions be implemented to protect the systems in an organization.   
 3.1 System Administrators 
• Updates 
Updates are very crucial to correct flaws existing in an OS or other applications. Most 
vendors put out security fixes at a rapid rate, therefore applying the latest patches 
provides for a more secure system. These patches minimize a vulnerability attack but not 
a flood attack. A flood attack can be minimized by ensuring a robust design of an 
organization.  
• AntiVirus/Antispyware Software Updates 
Signatures are patterns against which antivirus and antispyware programs match the files 
on the disk to identify as a virus, worm or trojan. Tweaking an existing virus can create a 
new version of the virus which can be left unidentified without the updates of antivirus 
softwares.   
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• Block Incoming Packets Addressed to the Broadcast Address 
In certain situations, a node in a network may require to send a broadcast message to its 
peers but there is no legitimate reason for an external device to send a broadcast message 
to every node on the network unless and until it wants to swamp the resources of the 
network through an IP directed broadcast, Smurf attack. Therefore Cisco routers, have an 
option to configure on every port of the router a 'no ip directed broadcast'. With this 
option enabled, the directed broadcast is routed through the network as a unicast packet 
until it arrives at the target subnet, where it is converted into a link-layer broadcast. The 
‘no ip directed-broadcast’ command is the default in Cisco IOS software version 12.0 and 
later [21].      
• Firewall 
A firewall examines packets passing to a computer or network and discards them if they 
do not meet certain criteria. Depending on the position of the firewall, access lists for 
filtering the packets are determined. The four types of firewall methods include Packet 
filtering, Circuit level gateways, Application level gateway and Stateful Inspection. In 
packet filtering, packets are filtered based on the ip address and port numbers. Known 
ports on which previous attacks have been performed should be blocked. Ports like the 
IRC port which has been associated with DDoS attacks and reserved IP address or Private 
IP address which will never run on public network should be blocked. New attacks which 
use a new set of port numbers, have to be detected first to be blocked. With tools for 
processor utilization or Network I/O performance and traffic monitoring, the statistics of 
attack traffic can be determined and excessive traffic can be blocked. In the Stateful 
inspection firewall method a connection is established only if the request is initiated from 
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within a network. This way if systems are scanned for vulnerabilities, only the address of 
the firewall is shown up and an intruder can not remotely access any system to install an 
agent or malware.  
• Ingress & Egress Filtering 
Ingress filtering is a process of filtering inbound traffic. The ingress router of an ISP is 
connected to a company's network to filter data entering it allowing attack traffic to be 
filtered at a higher tier. Egress filtering is a process of filtering outbound traffic and it 
controls the data leaving a network. Egress filtering is achieved by setting outbound 
filters on the egress router to ensure that only assigned IP address space leaves the 
network. Therefore systems within the network with egress filtering can't launch an 
attack by IP spoofing [45]. 
This kind of filtering is provided on the CISCO routers using access lists. Egress filtering 
is company dependent; hence a company should decide for itself what traffic would 
require leaving the intranet of the company. Based on the company's requirements routers 
should be configured to provide for egress filtering [21]. 
• Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
"A DMZ is a small subnetwork that sits between a trusted internal network, such as a 
corporate private LAN, and an untrusted external network, such as the public internet" 
[23]. Typically DMZ contains HTTP servers, FTP servers, SMTP servers & DNS servers 
which can be accessed by public traffic. Both external and internal machines can access 
servers in the DMZ. DMZs allow internal machines initiate requests outbound to the 
DMZ which in-turn responds, forwards or re-issues the request to the public as a proxy 
server but the LAN firewall prevents DMZ from initiating inbound traffic. DMZ is the 
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only zone public can access, they can't access the network of the company directly hence 
the internal servers are safe. In the event that an outside user penetrated the DMZ host's 
security, the Web pages might be corrupted but no other company information would be 
exposed [24]. 
• Unnecessary Services 
Services are programs that run when the computer starts up and continues to run as they 
aid the operating system in functionality.  There are many services that load and are not 
needed which take up memory space and CPU time. Disabling such services free up 
system resources and speed up the overall performance of a computer. These services are 
frequently the target of attempts to compromise and deny service to the machine.  
3.2  Resource Distribution within an Organization 
• Network Organization 
A well organized network will not have bottlenecks that can be easily targeted. It will 
have all critical applications across several servers distributed throughout the network in 
different subnetworks and connected to the internet via different ISPs. The attacker has to 
overwhelm all the servers to launch a denial service attack. Since critical applications are 
spread throughout the network, servers affected by the attack can be isolated and replaced 
with a robust system without loss of service. The separation of critical services from 
noncritical services can be performed on many levels. Following is an example of the 
distribution of resources within an organization [25]. 
 - Separating public services from private services.  
- Dividing n-tier architectures into their components: web, applications and database    
   servers.   
 32
- Using single-purpose servers for each service (SMTP, HTTP, FTP, DNS and others) 
- Splitting Internet, extranet and intranet services. 
• Proof of Work 
Asymmetric protocols consume more resources on the server side than on client side. 
These protocols are highly vulnerable as they require the server to allocate its resources 
without the client having to allocate any of its resources to furnish a request. The 
identification of the client is spoofed and attacker generates a large number of requests to 
tie up the servers resources rendering its services incapable for legitimate clients. An 
approach to protect against such attacks is to generate an asymmetry in favor of the 
server, requiring the client to allocate its resources before the request is granted. The 
server requires a proof of work from the client. A commonly used approach is to send 
the client cryptographic puzzles to solve which take up a fair amount of time and 
resources of the client. Verifying the answer doesn't require a lot of resource allocation 
on the server side. The cryptographic puzzles are not onerous for the clients to solve     
or notice but it definitely reduces the degree of a DDoS attack. A DDoS attack is slowed 
down drastically for illegitimate users to issue enough requests to cause a flood attack. 
This scheme works best for a small or medium scale DDoS attack [6]. 
• Honeypots  
Honeypots are fake computer systems that are used to collect data on intruders. A 
honeypot, loaded with fake information, appears to the hacker to be a legitimate machine. 
While it appears to contain operating system vulnerabilities that make it an attractive 
target for hackers, it actually prevents access to valuable data, administrative controls and 
other computers [26]. 
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3.3. Detection Mechanisms 
• Intrusion Detection System 
Intrusion detection is a first line of defense for a company's systems which detect 
unauthorized access attempts. There are two general types of intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs): network-based and host-based. A network-based IDS is a passive device that sits 
on the network and sniffs all packets crossing a given network segment. By looking at the 
packets, it looks for signatures that indicate a possible attack and sets off alarms on 
questionable behaviors. When it observes an event, IDS can send pages, email messages, 
take action to stop the event and record it for future forensic analysis. A host-based IDS 
runs on an individual server and actively reviews the audit log looking for possible 
indications of an attack.  It also monitors key system files for evidence of tampering.  It 
does not leave a network vulnerable between the moment of intrusion detection and the 
moment of consequential response [27].     
Most IDSs are built on two general technologies: pattern matching and anomaly 
detection.  Pattern matching technologies have a database of signatures of known attacks. 
When it finds packets that have a given pattern it sets off an alarm. Anomaly detection 
systems determine what ‘normal’ traffic for a network is and any traffic that does not fit 
within the norm is flagged as suspicious [27]. 
• Tuning System Parameters   
With all the tools in place to hamper a DDoS attack, the victim should have provisions to 
detect the hoard of illegitimate packets hammering the perimeter of a network. Network 
traffic monitoring tools, CPU utilization tools and Network performance tools can come 
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handy to analyze the statistics by comparing with a model of normal traffic and block the 
traffic from disrupting the services or exploiting vulnerability [6]. 
• Processor Utilization 
Programs like ps, top, netstat, vmstat, are useful for checking processor utilization. These 
programs help to understand the CPU utilization for an application. If an application 
consumes a high amount of CPU time (90%), there is every possibility that a vulnerable 
application is being targeted. With a model of normal utilization it can be easy to 
determine if it was an attack. 
• Disk I/O Performance 
vmstat, iostat and top are some useful programs which indicate the disk I/O performance 
of a system. If disk- monitoring programs, as iostat, infer high disk activity as compared 
to a model of normal disk activity, then it can be assumed that a vulnerable application is 
under attack. 
• Server Processes 
Web Servers typically have one process for listening to requests and many child 
processes to handle actual HTTP requests. If there is a very high rate of incoming 
requests, the number of processes should be increased to prevent overloading of the 
existing processes. Programs like top, ps, and netstat help to check overloading of the 
server processes. 
• Muti-Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG) 
"MRTG is a public domain package for producing graphs of various router statistics via 
a web page". It maps the inbound and outbound data throughput rates on the device it is 
polling. It also monitors CPU utilization of the device it is polling.  MRTG gives a visual 
 35
representation of the traffic on the network. Attack graph is indicated by spikes in the 
graphs which can be compared to a model of normal traffic throughput to identify an 
attack. Any layman can find this simpler than understanding jargon of the output for 
command line programs like ps and top [28]. 
Once the attack has been detected the victim should resort to either contacting its ISP to 
filter the attack traffic or identifying the attacker through traceback mechanisms. A comparison 

















CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF VARIOUS 
TRACEBACK SCHEMES 
 
DDoS attacks have become highly prevalent recently due to their intractability and 
relative ease of execution [3]. Because of IP spoofing, the origin of the attack packets is forged 
to an incorrect address causing traceback to the origin impossible. Traceback mechanisms form a 
critical part of the defense against DDoS attacks. These mechanisms don't rely on the source 
address of the packets but on the path through which the packets have traversed which makes it 
possible to get closer to the origin of the attack. By following the stream of packets from router 
to router within the network it is possible to trace back and locate the particular source that might 
be conducting an attack. Figure 4.1 shows the Internet topology with attack traffic being represen 
ted by an arrow and the trace back path from the victim to the attacker by a dotted line.  
Once the agent computer or the attacker itself is identified, the attack can be stopped easily and 
necessary legal actions can be taken against it. Even finding out partial path information would 
be useful because attacks could be throttled at far routers [3].  
 














The hierarchical attacking structure that detaches the control traffic from the attacking 
traffic effectively hides attackers even if the zombie computers are identified. Most of the 
methods are very limited because it is necessary to have access to all routers along the path from 
victim to attacker, and this is often not the case. The attacker’s packets may be traversing a 
number of domains under different administrative control. So, it is necessary to contact other 
network administrators, who have other demands of their time and may not be able to respond to 
an attack against a target for which they are not responsible [29].  
           A number of recent studies have been carried to solve the IP traceback problem. Table 4.1 
lists desired general properties of a traceback mechanism 
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4.1  Related Work 
Researchers have proposed various schemes to address the IP traceback problem. In this 
section, we identify the characteristics of a good traceback mechanism and we argue why 
previously proposed mechanisms do not achieve one or more of them. 
• Incremental Deployment: A traceback mechanism should function even when only 
partially deployed across routers in the Internet. If a traceback algorithm does not provide 
benefits for incremental deployment, an ISP would have no incentive to start deployment. 
For various administrative and technical reasons, not all routers might be willing to 
participate in the traceback mechanism. Even if most of the routers are willing, it is 
unrealistic to assume that all routers will start implementing the mechanism at the same 
time. It is more realistic that initially only few routers participate and slowly others start 
participating. Unfortunately, neither edge marking mechanisms nor logging schemes 
provide strong properties for incremental deployment [30].  
• Few Packets: Because of highly distributed nature of DDoS attacks, with each attacker 
sending only a few packets, a massive attack can be launched. Hence, complete traceback 
using only a small number of packets is especially useful for forensics. So far, only the 
SPIE mechanism enables single-packet traceback, and all other traceback approaches 
require on the order of thousands [3], [31, 32, 33] or tens of thousands of packets.  
• Router Overhead: The changes needed at the routers and router overhead need to be 
minimal. If a traceback mechanism only requires a minimal hardware change and has a 
negligible overhead for packet forwarding, it is more likely to be accepted by router 
manufacturers and eventually by the ISPs. Probabilistic packet marking techniques 
impose much lesser overhead on routers than logging mechanisms. 
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• Scalability: Scalability in terms of the number of attackers and in terms of high link 
speed is essential. However, both PPM and logging traceback schemes suffer from 
scalability problems. 
• Reconstruction Complexity: The time taken to reconstruct the attack graph should be 
small. Until the reconstruction is done the network and the victim will be under attack. 
Hence, a mechanism that only needs few packets, but lot of time to reconstruct might not 
be desirable.  
• Robustness: A traceback mechanism is robust if it has very low rate of false negatives 
and false positives even in presence of large number of attackers. 
4.2 Design Motivation 
An Autonomous System (AS) is a group of IP networks operated by one or more network 
operator(s), which has a single and clearly defined external routing policy. The classic definition 
of an Autonomous System is a set of routers under a single technical administration, using an  
IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) and common metrics to route packets within the AS, and using 
an exterior gateway protocol to route packets to other ASes. An Autonomous System Number 
(ASN) is a globally unique number in the Internet to identify an AS. An ASN is used in both the 
exchange of exterior routing information between neighboring ASes and as an identifier of the 
AS itself in the global Internet. AS numbers are 16-bit integers, assigned and managed by 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [34].  
Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBRs) are connected to more than one AS, to 
exchange routing information with routers in other ASes. ASBRs advertise the exchanged 
external routing information throughout their ASes. The traffic to/from an ASBR is controlled by 
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its ASBRs. Any traffic originating from (to) an AS to (from) a node outside the AS has to pass 
through an ASBR of the AS. 
4.2.1  Marking with AS Numbers Has the Following Advantage 
• The number of ASes is far less than the number of routers in the Internet. The Internet 
consists of around 35,000 ASes as compared to 1.6e+08 hosts [35]. The current rate of 
increase in ASes in the internet topology is 45% each year [36]. Since both the ASBR and 
internet routers are growing exponentially, obtaining an AS map of the Internet is feasible, 
while obtaining the Internet map itself is very difficult, if not impossible. 
• As shown in Figure 4.2, in more than 99.5% of cases, a packet passes through less than six 
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Figure 4.2 Normalized and Cumulative Histograms of Autonomous System path lengths 
 
• Privately owned ASes may not always like to disclose their network details. If each router in 
the AS participates in the marking scheme, then one can easily infer the network architecture 
by observing the markings. 
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• AS number is 16 bits in length while IPv4 address is 32-bit long (IPv6 address is 128 bits). 
Thus, encoding AS number needs less header space than encoding IP address, consequently, 
with the same mechanism, AS path construction needs far less packets than whole network 
path. 
• There is no scope for false positives because when a packet is marked, it carries the whole 
AS number of the router and the victim can reconstruct the attack path without any 
uncertainty. This relates to the third scheme, STM, proposed in this thesis report. 
 
4.3 Header Overloading 
 
We overload IP header to store router markings. Our mechanisms use 25 bits for marking.  
• The TOS Field 
The type of service field is an 8 bit field in the IP header that is currently used to allow  
special handling of traffic (for example, minimize delay, maximize throughput). This field 
has been rarely used in the past and we believe that setting this field arbitrarily makes no 
measurable difference in packet delivery. 
• The ID Field 
The ID field is a 16-bit field used by IP to permit reconstruction of fragments. Naive 
tampering with this field breaks fragment reassembly. Because less than 0.25% of all Internet 
trace is fragments [39], we believe that overloading this field is appropriate. A more in-depth 
discussion of the issues related to its overloading can be found in Savage’s work [40]. 
• The Unused Fragment Flag 
There is an unused bit in the fragment flags field that current Internet standards require to be 
zero. Setting this bit to one has no effect on current implementations; with the exception that 
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when receiving the packet, some systems will think it is a fragment. The packet, however, is 
still successfully delivered, because it looks to those systems as though it is fragment 1 of 1. 
4.4       Upstream Router Map 
 
 
Figure 4.3 The Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) rooted at V 
 
In the proposed schemes, the victim has a map of the upstream routers. The Directed 
Acyclic Graph (DAG) rooted at V as shown in Figure 4.3, represents the network as seen from a 
victim V and a distributed denial-of-service attack from A2 and A3. V could be either a single 
host under attack or a network border device such as a firewall representing many such hosts. 
Nodes Ri represent the ASBR, which we refer to as upstream routers from V. For every ASBR, 
Ri, we refer to the set of ASBRs immediately before Ri in the graph as the children of Ri, e.g. 
R3, R6 and R4 are R2’s children. The leaves {Ai} represent the potential attack origins, or 
attackers. The attack path from Ai is the ordered list of ASBRs between Ai and V that the attack 
packet has traversed, e.g. the dotted lines in the graph indicate two attack paths: (R6, R3, R2, R1) 
and (R7, R4, R2, R1). The distance of Ri from V on a path is the number of routers between Ri 
and V on the path. The attack graph is the graph composed of the attack paths. The packets are 
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referred to as attack packets. A router is a false positive if it is in the reconstructed attack graph 
but not in the real attack graph. A router is a false negative if it is in the true attack graph but not 
in the reconstructed attack graph [41]. 
4.5 Simulations 
To test the behavior of all the proposed schemes in real settings, we conducted a set of 
experiments on simulated attacks using a real traceroute dataset obtained from CAIDA [42]. The 
traceroute dataset contains 127,634 distinct traceroutes from a single source with the average 
path length of 25. We use Cisco Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) RIBs collected from University 
of Oregon Route Views Project [42] to convert IP addresses to AS numbers and hence obtained 
the  AS topology. The dataset had 7247 different ASes with an average of 4.6 ASes per path. 
 In all the tests, we assumed the single source of the traceroute dataset as the victim and 
the whole traceroute dataset as the map of upstream routers from the victim. In each test, we 
randomly selected a set of ASes ranging from 100-1500, as the attack originating AS and three 
destinations from each AS as attackers. We then simulated a Distributed Denial of Service attack 
which required attackers to launch an attack traffic against the victim. The attack packets were 
marked by intermediate ASBRs while traversing from the attacker to the victim. Simulations also 
included the reconstruction of the attack graph by the victim using the markings in the packets. 
The System configuration on which these simulations were performed are as follows: 
Hardware: Intel Pentium 4 machine with clock speed of 3 GHz and 2 GB RAM. 





CHAPTER 5: HIT: HIERARCHICAL IP TRACEBACK 
In this chapter, we propose HIT, a new probabilistic packet-marking approach for IP 
traceback. HIT achieves effective attributes due to the fact that it mainly employs Autonomous 
System Border Routers, ASBRs, in the marking procedure. ASBRs are few in number and more 
powerful when compared to normal routers and have higher incentives to implement traceback 
mechanisms.  
Hierarchical IP Traceback (HIT) is a much more effective scheme as compared to many 
other major traceback mechanisms such as Authenticated Marking Scheme (AMS), Fragment 
Marking Scheme (FMS) and Fast Internet Traceback (FIT). The efficiency of HIT is measured 
based on the properties like incremental deployment, network overhead, router overhead and 
number of packets. In contrast to previous work, HIT simultaneously achieves all the following 
properties: tens of packets to trace an attack path, scales to thousands of distributed attackers, is 
incrementally deployable, and requires no per-flow or per-packet state at routers. 
 HIT implements Probabilistic Packet Marking scheme in two phases of trace back. The 
first phase identifies the attack originating ASes while the second identifies the attacker within 
each AS. Once an attack originating AS is identified, the corresponding administrator can be 
notified who then proceeds to traceback to the attacker network location. The hierarchical nature 
of HIT makes reconstruction very efficient and scalable. 
The marking approaches for identifying the attack originating AS and the attacker itself 
are termed as Inter-AS level marking and Intra-AS level marking respectively. The Inter-AS 
level marking employs edge sampling algorithm while the Intra-AS level marking utilizes node 
sampling. To allow for practical deployment, HIT overloads 25 bits of the IP header (the IP 
identification field (16 bit), TOS field (8) and the unused Fragment Flag (1 bit)) to reserve bits 
 45
for 5 fields of marking. Figure 5.1 depicts our choice for partitioning (25 bits) of the IP header as 
follows:  
• 11 bits for the edge marking, the components of which are 11 bit hashed ASNs 
• 3 bits for distance field represents a maximum of 8 ASes a packet can traverse from the 
source to the victim. In more than 99.5% cases, a packet passes through less than 6 ASes 
before reaching its destination. 




Figure 5.1 Overloading of the IP header 
5.1  Inter-AS Marking 
 
  At this level only the ASBRs are involved in marking. An ASBR marks a packet with its 
ASN (Autonomous System Number) only if the packet is forwarded to a router belonging to 
another AS as shown in Figure 5.2 [34]. Thus, a packet may get marked only when it exits an 
AS.  
Edge-E Distance-DAS  Hid-i Hop-d Node-h(IP) 





Figure 5.2 Marking of a Packet Traversing from Attacker to Victim 
 
 The Inter-AS marking approach is similar to Authenticated Marking Scheme – II [41], 
but instead of encoding the IP address of a router, we encode the ASBR, ( )ji ASh . This scheme 
reserves bits for three fields, the Edge, Distance and Hash identification field for marking. To 
accommodate for these markings, bits of the IP header are overloaded as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.3 XOR Encoding [41] 
    
    The marking and reconstruction procedure shown in Figure 5.3 are described as follows: 
Every ASBR’s marks the outgoing packet, P, with a probability p when forwarding the packet. If 
an ASBR decides to mark a packet, it encodes its ASN with a hashing algorithm ( )ji ASh , to 
mark the edge field, E. The distance field is set to 0. The neighboring ASBR overwrites the edge 
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DAS is incremented and other fields are left unscathed. The edge field received at the victim will 
always have xor of two neighboring routers, except for samples from the ASBRs one hop from 








Figure 5.4 Marking Procedure at ASBR ASj 
5.2 AS Reconstruction  
 
 After enough packets have been sent, the victim would have received at least one 
marking from every router. The victim reconstructs the ordered paths using the upstream AS 
topology G. The victim arranges the edge markings of packets based on the distance field, DAS. 
We denote edge markings with ith hash id at a distance d as ( )dEi . 
 For every ( )0iE , the victim, v, compares the markings with the hash of its neighbors, 
( )( )vneighborshi  from G. If the two values match, then the neighbor is considered to be in the 
reconstructed graph, R0. R0 are the set of ASBRs, 0 hops away from the victim. For each ASBR, 
x, in Rd and for each edge marking, ( )1+dEi , the victim computes ( ) ( )1+⊕= dExhz ii  
and compares with the ( )( )xneighborshi  from G. If the victim finds a match then the neighbor 
is placed in the reconstructed graph Rd+1. This process is continued recursively until there are no 
for each packet P, 
  let u be a random number from [0, 1) 
   if (u<=p) then 
       let i be a random integer from [0, 8) 
           P.Distance = 0 
           P.Hid = i 
           P.Edge = hi(ASj)    
   else 
      If (P.Distance = 0) then 
        P. Edge = P. Edge xor P. hi(ASj)  
        P. Distance = P. Distance + 1 
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edge markings at a distance, d. 
 
  









Figure 5.5 Reconstruction Procedure at Victim v 
 
5.3 Intra-AS Marking 
 
 HIT reserves two fields for intra AS marking, an eight bit node field and a single bit 
distance field. At intra AS level, normal routers in the attack originating AS are involved in 
marking. These routers employ node sampling scheme and mark the attack packets with a 
probability q. The marking routers embed the node field with the hash of their IP addresses, 
( )IPh , and the distance field with hop count obtained from the TTL field in the IP header. These 
routers set the 5 least-significant bits of the packet’s TTL field (TTL[5..0]) to a global constant c, 
and store the sixth bit of the TTL in the distance field d. This mechanism is the same as that used 
in FIT [30]. When a packet arrives at its destination, the distance at which the packet was marked 
let  Rd be empty for 0 ≤d≤ maxd 
for each neighbor n of Victim v in G 
 let count = 0  
   for l=0 to 2w -1  
     if (hi(n) = Ei(0)) then 
       count = count +1 
     if count > m then 
        insert n into R0 
for d=0 to maxd - 1  
  for each x in Rd 
    for each neighbor u of x in G    
      let count = 0 
       for l=0 to 2w-1  
         for each edge Ei (d+1)       
            z=hi(x) xor Ei (d+1) 
             if (hi(u) = z) then  
                count = count +1; break 
              if count > m then 
                insert u in Rd+1 
Output Rd for 0 ≤d≤ maxd 
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is computed as: ( ) 64mod]0.5[TTLcdd −= , where cd denotes concatenation of the one bit 
distance field d with the five bit TTL replacement constant c. Because legacy routers decrement 
the TTL, the HIT distance is representative of the exact number of hops from a marking router, 
rather than just the number of hops of traceback enabled routers [30]. Figure 5.6 describes the 
marking procedure at router IPj 
 
   
 
 
Figure 5.6 Marking Procedure at Router IPj 
5.4 Reconstruction 
 
 Once the victim identifies the attack originating AS it gives a notification message to the 
corresponding AS administrator regarding compromised nodes launching attack traffic within its 
domain. The source AS then monitors the packets within its domain. The attack graph inside the 
AS is reconstructed based on the hashed IP address of the marking routers and their respective 
intra AS hop counts. Since node sampling is employed within the source AS, the markings that 
are received are the hash of the IP address of the marking nodes. For a particular hop count, the 
markings are compared with the hash values obtained from the upstream router topology 
information. The neighbor graph information could be obtained through routing protocols such 
as RIP and OSPF. Similar to the inter-AS level, the number of false positives and false negatives 
are obtained by comparing the reconstructed attack graph and the original attack graph at each 
intra AS hop count. Figure 5.7 describes the reconstruction procedure at victim v. 
for each packet P, 
 let u be a random number from [0,1) 
  if (u<=q) or (P. d|c - TTL[5..0]) mod 64> 32) then 
    P.Node = h(IPj)         
    P.Distance = TTL[5] 
       TTL[4..0] = c         
else 








Figure 5.7 Reconstruction Procedure at Victim v 
 
5.5  Performance Evaluation 
This section presents the general performance metrics considered to evaluate a traceback 
mechanism. It discusses two metrics that have been used previously and details on a new metric: 
Total Time to Traceback, proposed in this section. In the section, we present the simulation 
results for the discussed metrics. 
5.5.1 Performance Metrics 
Three performance metrics, number of false positives (FP), number of packets required to 
reconstruct the attack graph (Pkts) and total time to traceback to the attacker (TTT) are 
considered for evaluating the performance of HIT. 
• Number of False Positives at Inter AS Level (FP) 
We evaluate the performance of HIT with the number of false positives the map 
reconstruction algorithm can produce. A false positive is said to occur when two ASBRs or 
IP addresses share a common subset of hash values which are received by the reconstructing 
victim. The victim will not be able to differentiate between the two ASBRs and will thus add 
both of them to the reconstructed map. It is desirable to keep the false positive rate low even 
in presence of several hundreds of attackers. The number of false positives generated during 
reconstruction of the attack graph is drastically reduced if a number of hash functions are 
Let Sd be empty for 0 ≤d≤ maxd 
for d:= 0 to maxd - 1 
   for each marking n at d 
      for each child u of y at d in G 
         if( n = h(u)) 
           insert u in Rd 
 
 Output Rd for 0 ≤d≤ maxd 
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employed in the scheme. The intuition is that the probability for any AS to have the same 
hash value as another for one hash function is x2
1 , where x is the number of bits used to 
encode the ASN information. Therefore the probability that the same can happen for y 
independent hashing functions is yx )2
1(  . We use an m-threshold scheme, wherein a node u 
in Gm will only be considered to be in the attack path if more than m of its hash values from 
2w hash functions match the right markings in the attack packets, where w is the number of 
bits allocated for hash id field.  
Let Ty denote the in-degree of element y in Rd-1, the reconstructed graph at a distance d-1 and   
⏐Ed ⏐be the number of unique edge segments received by the victim at a distance d.  Because 
the hash value is 11 bits, the probability of a false positive for m threshold scheme is given 
by  
                                                                                   ( )m1121                                                                              [5.1]                         
  
The expected number of false positives among y’s children for m- threshold scheme is given 
by  
                                                       wdly
ET w −≤≤Π 1121 2*                                                  [5.2]                    
The total number of expected false positives in y’s children for all y in the sets {Rd}0≤d≤maxd is  















ET                                             [5.3]                  
Computational Complexity of the algorithm is  
                                                         )( 1+∗∑ dd ERO                                                      [5.4] 
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• Number of False Positives at Intra AS Level (FP) 
The average size of an AS ranges from 250 to 1000 nodes with an average diameter of 10. 
Therefore the hash of IP address (32 bits) to 8 bits will result in nearly zero false positives. 
Theoretically, the average number of false positives is given by  
                                                    Number of Nodes at a hop count / 28                                      [5.5] 
• Number of Packets Required to Reconstruct (Pkt) 
The second performance metric for map reconstruction is the number of packets that must be 
sent to enable a victim to reconstruct the IP addresses of the routers on a single path. This 
number calculated below provides an upper bound on the number of packets needed to 
reconstruct a map containing multiple paths. 
Let p be the marking probability of an ASBR for a path with d routers. The probability that a 
given packet will deliver a sample from some router is at least  
1)1( −− dpdp                                                                  [5.6]  
The number of packets required for a victim to reconstruct a path of length d has an upper 




d                                                            [5.7]     
There are a very few paths in the internet topology which exceed a path length 25 [40]. With 
p=1/25 and d=25, number of packets required to reconstruct a path of 25 is 215. A packet 
traverses through less than 6 ASBR on an average. With p=1/7 and d=7, packets required are 
35. 
• Total Time to Traceback (TTT) 
While number of packets needed to reconstruct is an important criteria, we believe that the 
Total Time to Traceback is much more crucial. This is the time taken for the victim to 
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construct the attack graph and to trace the attacker, once the victim detects that an attack has 
been launched. Thus,   
      T = TPkt + TR                                                    [5.8] 
 where TPkt is time taken to receive enough number of packets and TR is the reconstruction 
time. Thus, the network would be under attack for a duration TTT (units). TR is traceback 
mechanism dependant. There are two related consequences to a flooding attack – the network 
load induced and the impact on the victim’s CPU. To load the network, an attacker generally 
sends small packets as rapidly as possible since most network devices (both routers and 
NICs) are limited not by bandwidth but by packet processing rate. Thus, TPkt is small. Thus, 
to reduce load on the network and curb the attack fast, the traceback mechanism needs to be 
efficient, so that TR will be small.  
5.5.2 Simulation Results 
• AS Traceback 
As more than 99.5% of paths encountered in the Internet have an AS path length less than or 
equal to six, we propose to set the marking probability to 1/6.  
Figure 5.8 shows the number of packets needed to reconstruct the AS attack graph 
for different schemes. For m>2/4 scheme, after as few as 30 packets are received from 
each AS path, a victim can construct more than 98% of ASes in the attack graph. For 
m>6/8 scheme the number is slightly higher. The victim needs around 60 packets to 





















               Figure 5.8 Number of Packets vs False Negatives 
 
 The performance of various schemes in terms of false positives is shown in Figure 
5.9. As predicted, the m>6/8 scheme performs the best with just around 30 false positives 
while m>2/4 scheme gives more number of false positives, around 200 in the presence of 






















Figure 5.9 Number of Attackers vs False Positives 
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 Figure 5.10 shows the time required to reconstruct the attack graph. The m>6/8 
scheme takes the maximum time because of the presence of a large number of 
combinations. Both m>3/4 and m>2/4 take similar time durations to reconstruct the 
attack graph. It is observed that even in the worst case, the reconstruction of attack graph 

























Figure 5.10 Number of Attackers vs Reconstruction time 
 
• IP Traceback 
This section presents the simulation results for reconstruction mechanism of the IP path 
within the originating AS. IP marking is based on node sampling rather than edge sampling. 
Figure 5.11 shows the number of false positives generated for different sized ASes. For an 
AS size of 1500 nodes there are approximately 3 false positives for a scheme without a 
distance field while there are negligible false positives generated for a scheme with the 
distance field.  
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Figure 5.11 Number of Nodes vs False Positives 
 
• Comparison with AMS. 
In this section, we compare the performance of HIT with AMS. AMS attempts to reconstruct 
the whole IP attack path, while HIT first reconstructs the AS path and then reconstructs the 
IP path within the attack originating AS. To make an accurate comparison between HIT and 
AMS, we ran AMS on the same data set as HIT.   
Figure 5.12 shows the number of packets required for a victim to traceback the attack 
originating ASes. While HIT reconstructs to the attacker with less than 100 packets (for both 
AS path reconstruction and originating IP location within the AS), AMS requires more than 























Figure 5.12 Number of Packets vs False Negatives 
 
Figure 5.13 compares the performance of HIT and AMS in terms of false positives. HIT 
(m > 2/4) gives more false positives than AMS (m>6/8). But, performance of HIT (m > 3/4) and 
HIT (m > 6/8) are comparable to that of AMS (m>6/8). In the case of scheme, HIT, the false 
positive rate is zero in the IP-traceback stage therefore we considered the false positives at the 
























 Figure 5.14 compares the reconstruction time for various threshold values of HIT with 
m>6/8, threshold for AMS. The performance gain with HIT is obvious and this is a result of 
dealing with smaller topologies first at AS-level and just the originating AS topology for the 



























                  Figure 5.14 Number of Attackers vs Reconstruction Time 
 
 To compare the overall performance of different traceback schemes, we use a new metric 
– Total Time to Traceback – as defined in Section 5.5.1. Figure 5.15 compares the TTT for 
both AMS and HIT. For this purpose, we assumed that each attacker sends packets at a rate of 
10 pkts/sec. Even in case of 1500 attackers, HIT (m>3/4) is able to traceback the attackers 

























                     Figure 5.15 Number of Attackers vs Total Traceback Time (sec) 
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CHAPTER 6: FAST: FAST AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM TRACEBACK 
This chapter describes, FAST (Fast Autonomous System Traceback), a novel packet 
marking approach in which an AS path fingerprint is embedded in each packet, enabling a victim 
to identify packets traversing the same AS paths through the Internet on a per packet basis, 
regardless of the source IP address spoofing [2]. FAST features many unique properties. It is a 
per-packet deterministic mechanism: each packet traveling along the same AS path can carry 
only any of the pre-determined identifiers. This allows the victim to identify the source AS of the 
packet in real-time thus prompting pro-active actions to curb the attack. 
 This approach embeds in each packet an identifier, based on the router path that a packet 
traverses. The victim needs to receive only a few packets from a given AS path to reconstruct the 
path. What makes this possible is that our packet marking is deterministic – all packets traversing 
the same path carry one of the subset of markings. All previous marking schemes that we are 
aware of are probabilistic in nature, in which the victim needs to collect a large number of 
packets to reconstruct the path. In our approach, the victim can traceback in real-time to the 
originating AS upon receiving just over 8 to 10 packets. FAST is extremely light-weight, both on 
the routers for marking, and on the victims for decoding and filtering. Above all, FAST employs 
only AS border routers for marking. The advantages of ASBRs being involved in marking has 
been discussed in the previous chapter.  
6.1 Node Append 
 
The simplest marking algorithm – conceptually similar to the IP Record Route option 
[40] – is to append each node's address to the end of the packet as it travels through the network 
from attacker to victim. Consequently, every packet received by the victim arrives with a 
complete ordered list of the routers it traverses – a built-in attack path. The node append 
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algorithm is both robust and extremely quick to converge (a single packet), however it has 
several serious limitations when normal routers are involved in marking. Principal among these 
is the unfeasibly high router overhead incurred by appending data to packets in flight [40]. This 
problem arises only when normal routers with lower processing speeds and memory are involved 
in marking.  
6.2 Marking 
FAST employs ASBRs in node append mode of marking. An ASBR marks a packet with 
its ASN (Autonomous System Number) only if the packet is forwarded to a router belonging to 
another AS [34]. Thus, a packet may get marked only when it exits an AS. This scheme reserves 
25 bits of the IP header for 3 fields of marking. The 25 bits of the IP header are overloaded as 
follows 
Table 6.1 Encoding Node Field into the IP header 
 
 
    In FAST each ASBR encodes its ASN, hi(AS) with hashing algorithm id, Hid, to mark 
the Node field in a packet P. The hashing algorithm compresses the ASN from 16 bits to 4 bits. 
Therefore each ASBR appends its 4 bit hashed ASN in the Node field. Since 99.7% of AS paths 
are of length less than 6 this scheme reserves 20(4*5) bits for the Node field. The ASBR of the 
AS containing the victim is not involved in marking hence on an average 5 ASBRs are involved 
in marking in FAST. The Hop field is incremented by 3 every time a router marks the packet. 
This field serves as an offset for the neighboring ASBR to mark in the Node field.  Figure 6.2 
shows the FAST packet marking, for packets traversing from the attacker A1 to attack 
20 bits 3 bits 2 bits 
Node Append - N Hop       Hid 
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originating AS through ASBRs AS1, AS4 and AS5. Figure 6.3 describes the marking procedure 
at ASBR ASj. 
 









Figure 6.2 Marking Procedure at ASBR ASj 
 
6.3 Reconstruction 
Once the attacker receives around 8-10 packets from each path it can begin the process of 
reconstruction. The victim stores the upstream router map from which it can obtain sets of  paths 
of various path lengths. The victim compares the markings of a particular path length with hash 
of ASes in suspect attack paths of the same path length. If the count of paths identified is greater 
than or equal to a threshold m, then the paths are considered as attack paths.  
A1 A2 A3 
AS4 





h(AS1) | h(AS4) 
h(AS1) | h(AS4) | h(AS5) 
  P.Hop = 0   
 for each packet P, 
   let i be a random integer from [0,4) 
     P.Node = hi (ASj)     
     P.Hop   = P.Hop + 3 
     P.hid     =   i 
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Figure 6.3 Reconstruction Procedure at Victim v 
 
6.4 Performance Evaluation 
Path reconstruction is the most critical performance aspect of a traceback scheme. Three 
performance metrics, number of false positives (FP), number of packets required to reconstruct 
the attack graph (Pkts) and reconstruction time (RT) are considered for evaluating the 
performance of FAST. 
6.4.1 Performance Metrics 
• Number of False Positives at Inter AS Level (FP) 
We evaluate the performance of FAST with the number of false positives the map 
reconstruction algorithm can produce. A false positive is said to occur when two ASBRs 
share a common subset of hash values which are received by the reconstructing victim. The 
victim will not be able to differentiate between the two ASBRs and will thus add both of 
them to the reconstructed map. It is desirable to keep the false positive rate low even in 
presence of several hundreds of attackers. 
Theoretically, the number of false positives generated for A number of attackers at path 
length P is given by  
 For all markings received at v 
 If(count(Nodes in suspected attack path) = count (Markings in a packet)) 
     For marking x at hop i in the packet & For node n at hop i in suspected attack path  
          If (x = hash(n)) for all i then  
                Push(path) into array a 
 
      If count(path) in a > m then 
            Push(path) into array attack path 
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     ( ) NAhP ∗⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −− ∗2111                                               [6.1] 
 where h is the number of bits to which an ASN is hashed and N is the numbers of suspected 
attack originating ASes at path length P. The traceroute datasets obtained from CAIDA had 
1564 unique ASN at hop count 4. These constants when substituted in the theoretical formula 
for 150 attackers and 4 bits ASN hash gives negligible false positives.  
• Number of Packets Required to Reconstruct (Pkt) 
The second performance metric for map reconstruction is the number of packets that must be 
sent to enable a victim to reconstruct the IP addresses of the routers on a single path. Since 
this scheme utilizes a deterministic marking approach the number of packets to identify the 
attack paths is 8-10. 
6.4.2 Simulation Results 
 
We considered the AS topology and the distribution of attackers on the Internet according 
to the graph in figure 4.2. Simulations for the number of false positives generated for various 
path lengths and attackers were conducted. Also, simulations of the reconstruction time for a 
varied number of attackers were performed.  
Figure 6.4 gives the relation between the AS path lengths and the number of false 
positives for two schemes. The scheme with L=4 bits has fewer false positives as compared to 
the scheme with L=3 bits for various path lengths. In both the schemes the number of false 
positives reduce with increase in AS path length. In the scheme with L=4 bits the false positives 
are zero at AS path length 4, while for the other scheme the false positives reduce to zero at 6 AS 
hop counts. This graph justifies the theoretical formula, an increase in AS path length causes a 





















Figure 6.4 AS Path Length vs Number of False Positives 
 
Figure 6.5 gives a relation between the number of attackers and the number of false 
positives for two schemes. The attack originating ASes were selected randomly in sets ranging 
from 100 to 1000 ASes from the dataset obtained from CAIDA. The scheme with L=4 bits has 
fewer false positives compared to the scheme with L=3 bits for various attackers. The former 
scheme has a larger sample space as the 16 bit ASN is hashed to 4 bits causing fewer collisions 











































Figure 6.6 Number of Attackers vs Reconstruction Time (sec) 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the relationship between the number of attackers and reconstruction time. 
Scheme with L=4 bits takes lesser time to reconstruct to the attacker in comparison to the scheme 
with L=3 bits for different sets of attackers. For both the schemes the reconstruction time is in 
tens of seconds. With 1000 randomly picked attackers launching DDoS attacks, FAST only takes 
20sec to reconstruct for the scheme with L=4 bits. 
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CHAPTER 7: STM: SIMPLE TRACEBACK MECHANISM 
                 Simple Traceback Mechanism is a simple scheme to trace back to the attackers 
launching DDoS attacks. Like HIT, this scheme also traces back to the attacker in two phases. In 
the first phase the victim traces back to the attack originating ASes and in the second phase the 
attackers within these domains are identified.   
7.1 Packet Marking: 
In STM, as in all other PPM schemes, routers overwrite some fields in the IPv4 header. 
The IP identification field of the IP header is overloaded as follows when the ASN is marked: 12 
bits for the hash of ASN, 3 bits for the hash id and 1 bit for the flag field. The same field is 
overloaded as follows when the IP address is encoded and used for marking the packet: 11 bits 
for hash of IP address, 3 bits for hash id, 1 bit for distance and 1 bit for the flag id to identify if 
the marking in the packet is the hash of ASN or IP address. 
Table 7.1 Encoding Node Field into IP header 
 
 The STM router within an AS marks the forwarded packet with a probability of p or q, 
which are global constants for all the STM routers (set to .01 and .04 in our experiments). Three 
fields are marked by an STM router, the 12 bit ASN node field, 2 bit hash id field 1 bit flag field 
and the 1 bit distance field when a packet is marked with probability p. Each router calculates a 
hash the ASN it belongs to and sets the flag to zero. A router marking a packet with probability 
q, encodes the IP node, distance and flag field. The marking router calculates the hash of its IP 
address, sets the flag to one and sets the 5 least significant bits of the packet's TTL to a global 
Hid Flag  
12 bits 2 bits 1 bit 
Node- h(ASN)/h(IP) Distance 
1 bit 
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constant c and stores the 6th bit of the TTL in the distance field [30]. This allows the victim to 












Figure 7.1 Marking Procedure at Router IPj 
 
7.2  Path Reconstruction 
The victim receives packets with ASN, IP, flag and distance fields. Upon receiving 
enough packets the victim utilizes the upstream ASBR map to identify the attack originating AS. 
All the ASBRs in the upstream map are scanned to match markings in the ASN field of the 
packets with flag id set to zero. If there is a match these ASBRs are placed in the reconstructed 
map. The victim receives markings of the nodes in the attack originating AS, from the ( )IPh  
and distance fields in the packets. The distance at which the packet was marked is computed as: 
( ) 64mod]0.5[TTLcdd −= , where cd denotes concatenation of the one bit distance field d 
with the five bit TTL replacement constant c [30]. The victim scans through the space of all 
for each packet P, 
 let u be a random number from [0,1) 
 let I be a random number from [0,8) 
  if (p<u<=q) OR (P. fID|c - TTL[5..0]) mod 64> 32) then 
    P.Node = h(IPj)         
    P.Distance = TTL[5] 
    TTL[4..0] = c         
    P.ASN=0 
    P.Flag=1 
   P.Hid=0 
else 
       TTL = TTL – 1 
If (u<=p) 
  P.ASN = h(ASNj) 
  P.Hid=i 
  P.Flag=0 
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possible IP addresses at a particular distance to match the markings from the packets. If a match 
exists it is placed in the reconstructed attack graph. 
7.3  Performance Metrics 
Path reconstruction is the most critical performance aspect of a traceback scheme. 
Performance is measured in terms of false positives, reconstruction time and number of packets 
to traceback to the attacker. 
• False Positives 
At the AS level the false positives are determined by the size of the AS topology and the 
number of hashing algorithms employed for encoding.  
                                                Size of the AS topology / (212) 8                                                 [7.1] 
       Within an AS the number of false positives is determined by the count of normal routers at a 
distance, d, from the victim.  
                              Routers within an AS at a distance, d, from victim /(211) 8                          [7.2] 
 
• Number of Packets to Reconstruct the Attack Path 
At both levels, node sampling is the mode of marking. The probability of receiving a packet 
from a node i hops from the ASBR, given marking probability p is  
                                                                     [ ] 1)1(, −−= im pppiP                                                                [7.3]                             
We assume that samples from all the routers appear with the same likelihood as the furthest 
router. The upper bound for the required number of packets for victim to reconstruct the path 
is given by 
                                                           1)1(
ln
−− ipp
d                                                        [7.4] 
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 The experimental results strictly followed the theoretical analysis. 30 packets were 
required to reconstruct a path to the attack originating AS. Since node sampling is the mode 
of marking, SMT can identify a router far away before identifying all the routers 
downstream. SMT could be at its best as a two packet mechanism, the first to reach the AS 
and the second to reach the attacker.  
• Reconstruction Time 
This parameter is dependent on the number of attackers, topology, and number of packets 
required to identify the attackers. The total time for reconstruction is the time taken to 
identify the attack originating AS and the attackers within an AS. A modern workstation can 
calculate the SHA-1 hash of all 232 IP address in approximately 30 minutes [30]. There are 
around 213 ASN in the internet today therefore on an average time taken to reconstruct to an 
AS and the attacker within an AS will be less than a second.  The experimental results tallied 
with the theoretical analysis. 
7.4 STM Advantages & Disadvantages 
 Since STM adopts 1 bit distance field of FIT [30] and therefore has the advantage of 
freeing 4 additional bits in the IP header, which can be used for larger hash hence reducing the 
number of false positives. STM also uses node sampling which reduces computational overhead 
over AMS and other PPM schemes. STM uses the hash of an IP address in contrast to FIT which 
requires the comparisons of fragments of the hashed IP address. This offers a significant 
advantage over FIT which suffers from combinatorial explosion of computations. STM has a 
better edge in reconstruction time over FIT as the number of nodes scanned to identify an 
attacker is far less.  
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The main disadvantage of STM arises due the node sampling mode of marking which 
makes this scheme susceptible to pollution attacks, the attacker sends malicious fragments that 




















CHAPTER 8: SIMULATIONS 
                  This chapter gives an overview on the background work done for simulations. All the 
simulations for generating an AS topology and for implementing the proposed algorithms were 
developed using Perl. The simulator has been modularized, so as to enable the user to choose an 
AS topology or Internet topology of any size. These topologies form the test bed to implement 
existing and new algorithms. The Internet topology with IP paths was obtained from Route 
Views, a project which was originally conceived as a tool for Internet operators to obtain real-
time information about the global routing system from the perspectives of several different 
backbones and locations around the Internet [42]. Data from Route Views is used by 
organizations to map IP addresses to origin ASes for various topological studies.  Route Views 






                                                    
Figure 8.1 BGP Table 
 
           Routing information in this file indicates that the network 3.0.0.0/8 belongs to the AS80, 
4.0.0.0/8 to 3356 and so on. In order to map IP addresses from a path to their corresponding 
ASN, the range of the IP addresses which belongs to an ASN was determined using the concepts 













   
 
 
                                           Figure 8.2 Address Range for ASN 
 
 A real traceroute dataset was obtained from the Cooperative Association for Internet Data 
Analysis (CAIDA). The traceroute dataset contained complete and incomplete distinct 
traceroutes from a single source to multiple destinations.  
 
Figure 8.3 Traceroute Dataset 
 
 Complete paths were identified and used for simulations. Each of the IP addresses from 
the complete traceroute paths was then mapped to the network it belonged to and the 
corresponding ASN was taken into an AS file which was used in forming the AS topology. 
There were IP addresses for which there were no corresponding legitimate AS and therefore it 
was not possible to fully convert every trace route path to an AS path. Some IP addresses could 
not be mapped to an AS because they lacked a matching prefix in RouteViews [43]. Other 
Addressable Range         ASN 
 
3.0.0.1    3.255.255.254    80 
4.0.0.1    4.255.255.254    3356 
4.17.225.1 4.17.225.254   6496 
4.17.226.1 4.17.227.254   6496 
4.17.251.1 4.17.251.254   6496 
4.17.252.1 4.17.253.254   6496 
4.21.252.1 4.21.253.254   19198 
T       128.8.7.4       206.27.119.251  0       0       1086048002      R       48.602  16      240     S       0     
C       128.8.7.28,0.505,1      128.8.0.9,0.324,1       128.8.0.82,0.475,1      128.8.0.234,0.287,1     
206.196.177.49,0.317,1  206.196.178.45,0.830,1  65.114.173.1,0.654,1    205.171.9.61,0.656,1    
205.171.8.182,4.914,1   205.171.17.33,4.911,1   205.171.8.229,25.315,1  205.171.20.170,25.088,1 
205.171.20.66,24.958,1  63.145.140.150,104.469,1        63.148.10.2,51.061,1 
T       128.8.7.4       203.80.119.251  0       0       1086048002      N       0       0       0       G       5       
I       128.8.7.28,0.744,1      128.8.0.9,0.366,1       128.8.0.82,0.694,1      128.8.0.234,0.272,1     
206.196.177.49,0.374,1  206.196.178.45,0.989,1  65.114.173.1,0.684,1    205.171.9.93,0.713,1    
205.171.209.114,1.877,1 205.171.251.38,2.118,1  192.205.32.29,2.860,1   12.123.9.82,3.510,1     
12.122.10.30,25.957,1   12.122.9.142,26.560,1   12.122.10.14,64.354,1   12.123.199.113,63.474,1 
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addresses could not be mapped because they fell within reserved address space. In our 
conversion from IP paths to AS paths we replaced such addresses with their adjacent ASes. The  
AS file was given as input to another Perl tool to generate the AS topology. 
 
 
Figure 8.4 AS Topology 
 
The first line in the above file indicates that AS14742 has children AS16097, AS21651 and 
AS6364. Similarly the IP topology is also generated. 
All the three algorithms proposed were tested on this topology. The outputs for all the algorithms 
are as follows: 
HIT 
 
 For 25 attack paths,  
Marking probability: .25, 
Packets sent through each path: 150.  
HIT with 1 hashing algorithm gives the following results 
 
False Positives: 4.8  
False Negatives: 0 
Reconstruction time: 0. 
 





Figure 8.5 HIT Results 
 
14742 16097 21651 6364 
26793 3549 





















For 50 attack paths, m>3/4. 
  
The reconstructed attack paths are 2914 10919 7349, 
3561 6762 3269 and so on. 
 
False Positives 6 
False Negatives 0  
 
Figure 8.6 FAST Results 
 
STM 
For 25 attack paths,  
Marking probability: .25,  
Packets sent through each path 30 
 
False Positives: 0 
False Negatives: 0 
Reconstruction time: 0 
 






















R 2914 10910 7349 
R 3561 6762 3269 
R 1239 5588 2819 
R 2914 9299 7629 
 
False Positives 6 
False Negatives 0  
For 25 
-------- 




CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 This thesis presented three trace back schemes against Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks. All the three schemes were implemented on an AS and IP topology. The schemes aimed 
at providing a realistic solution to the problem which arises due to the fact that the attacker's 
packets may traverse through a number of domains under different administrative controls. Most 
of the methods are very limited because for those schemes it is necessary to have access to all 
routers along the path from victim to attacker, and this is often not the case. The proposed 
schemes give control to the Autonomous system administrator to monitor its traffic and do the 
required to halt the DDoS attack. 
The Internet Hierarchical IP Traceback mechanism was developed to provide 
experimental results for evaluating its performance metrics in comparison with those of 
Authenticated Marking Scheme. Theoretically and experimentally HIT proved to be a better 
scheme because of its inherent nature of running on the AS topology. Reconstruction time was 
one of the main parameters which evaluated the performance of this scheme. Even, in the worst 
case the reconstruction time for HIT was in the order of 10s of seconds. This is a very important 
metric because of the tremendous growth in automated and distributed nature of the DDoS 
attacks which requires the victim to reconstruct to the attacker within seconds. 
The performance of FAST was evaluated on a dataset of varying hop length. With the 
internet topology distributed such that most of the AS paths have path lengths of four and five, 
FAST performs very efficiently at these path lengths. FAST also requires a very few packets to 
reconstruct to the attack originating AS.  
Simple Traceback Mechanism was developed to improve the performance of Fast 
Internet Traceback Scheme. It is an efficient scheme as the victim reconstructs to the attacker in 
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no time and with a very few packets. But this scheme has its own drawbacks as it is susceptible 
to pollution attacks. Encryption and authentication schemes have to be employed with SMT to 
handle its limitations.  
Future work can incorporate schemes like algebraic approach to traceback on an AS 
topology. A mix of reactive and preventive schemes (filtering) can be implemented against 
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#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch 




@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); 
bootstrap Crypt::MD5; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n"; 
 
$deepest = -1; 
%attacknodes = (); 
$victim = 0; 
 
# Parameters 
$samples = 5; 
@tests = ( 100,250, 550, 750, 1000,1500); 
 
$markprob = 0.25; # Probability of router to mark a packet 
$num_pack = 455;# Number of packets each attacker sends 
$match_threshold = 3; # if ( $match > $match_threshold ) range of match is 0 
.. 8 
$probabilistic = 1; 
 
$storeprob = 2500 / 125000; 
# read in all the long paths 
print "Read all paths\n"; 
open( INPUT, "zcat HIT.dat.gz |" ) || die "Could not open and zcat 
HIT.dat.gz\n"; 
@allpaths = (); 
while ( $_ = <INPUT> ) { 
 if ( $storeprob > rand()) { 
  chop; 
  @ips = split /\s/, $_; 
  if ( $victim == 0 ) { 
   $victim = $ips[0]; 
  } elsif ( $victim != $ips[0] ) { 
   die "$victim != $ips[0]\n"; 
  } 
  push @allpaths, [@ips]; 
 } 
} 
close( INPUT ); 
print "Done reading all paths, stored $#allpaths paths\n"; 
 
print "Read neighbors\n"; 
%neighbor = (); 
if ( 1 ) { 
 open( NEIGHBOR, "zcat HITneigh.dat.gz |" ) || die "Could not open 
neighbor file\n"; 
 while ( <NEIGHBOR> ) { 
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  chop; 
  @ns = split /\s/, $_; 
  $neighbor{$ns[0]} = [()]; 
  for ( $i=1; $i <= $#ns; $i++ ) { 
   if ( $ns[0] != $ns[$i] ) { 
    push @{ $neighbor{$ns[0]}}, $ns[$i]; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 close( NEIGHBOR ); 
} 
print "Done reading neighbors\n"; 
 
for $v ( @tests ) { 
 $avgfp = 0; 
 $avgfn = 0; 
        $avgtime = 0; 
 print "$v\n"; 
 for $w ( 1 .. $samples ) { 
  # print " .\n"; 
  simulate( $v ); 
  $avgfp += $fp; 
                $avgtime += $delta_t; 
  $avgfn += $fn; 
 
 } 
 $avgfp /= $samples; 
 $avgfn /= $samples; 
 $avgtime /= $samples; 
         print "FP  $avgfp\n"; 
         print "FN  $avgfn\n"; 
        print "RT $avgtime\n"; 
} 
 
exit( 0 ); 
 
sub compute_routers_at_depth { 
 my ( $vip, $distance ) = @_; # vip = victim ip, prev = next hop 
 my $i = 0; 
 my $att; 
 my $curdepth = $routers_at_depth_list[$distance]; 
 
 if ( $distance > $deepest ) { 
  print "Ups - something is wrong $distance $vip\n"; 
 } 
 if ( ! exists $curdepth->{$vip} ) { 
  $curdepth->{$vip} = 0; 
  $routers_at_depth_num[$distance]++; 
 } 
 if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip } ) { 
  # We are at the leaf 
  # print "  Leaf\n"; 
 } else { 
  # look through all the attackers 
  $att = $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip }; 
  # Recurse 
  for ( $i=0; $i <= $#{$att}; $i++ ) { 
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   compute_routers_at_depth( $att->[$i], $distance + 1 ); 




sub MD5_8bitv1 { 
    my ($str, $s) = @_; 
 my $ret = 0; 
 
 $str = $str . "1" . $s; 
 $MD5->reset(); 
 $MD5->add($str); 
 $ret = unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**11); 
 
    return $ret; 
} 
 
sub MD5_8bitv2 { 
    my ($str, $s) = @_; 
 my $ret = 0; 
 
 $str = $str . "2" . $s; 
 $MD5->reset(); 
 $MD5->add($str); 
 $ret = unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**11); 
 




sub simulate { 
 my ($num_attackers) = @_; 
 my @attackerpath = (); 
 my $num_paths = -1; 
 my %attackercount = (); 
 my $adjust = 0; 
 my @tmp = (); 
 my @marked_hash = (); # 3-dimensional array [depth][frag#][maked#] 
 my $j; 
 my $i; 
 my $k; 
 my $path; 
 my $marked; 
 my $depth; 
 my $ip; 
 my @tmp2; 
 my $frag; 
 my $ipnum; 
 my $hash; 
 my $ipnumf; 
 my $hashf; 
 my $mharr; 
 my $found; 
 my %tmp; 
 my $start_time; 
 my $end_time; 
 my @suspected_set = (); 
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 my $susp; 
 my $neigh; 
 my $s; 
 my $matches; 
 my $n; 
 my $neighhash; 
 my $susphash; 
 my @fp = (); # False positive at level 
 my @fn = (); # False negative at level 
  $delta_t = 0; 
 my $rout; 
 my @selected = (); 
 
 # print "Simulating $num_attackers attackers\n"; 
 %attacknodes = (); 
 $deepest = -1; 
  whileloop: while ( $num_attackers > 0 ) { 
   do { 
    $j = int(rand( $#allpaths + 1 )); 
    @tmp = grep { $_ == $j } @selected; 
 
 
   } until ( $#tmp < 0 ); 
   $num_attackers--; 
   push @selected, $j; 
   $k = $allpaths[$j]; 
   $adjust = 0; 
   for ( $i=0; $i < $#{$k}; $i++ ) { 
        if ( $k->[$i] != $k->[$i+1] ) { 
      push @tmp, $k->[$i]; 
       if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} ) { 
        $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i] } = [($k->[$i+1])]; 
     $attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1] } = 1; 
     }  
                else { 
           @tmp2 = grep {$_ == $k->[$i+1]} @{$attacknodes{ $i -   
                                                        $adjust, $k->[$i] }}; 
      if ( $#tmp2 < 0 ) { 
       push @{ $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} }, $k->[$i+1]; 
       $attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]} = 1; 
      }  
                else { 
       $attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]}++; 
           } 
         } 
            }  
             else { 
     $adjust++; 
        } 
        } 
   push @tmp, $k->[$#{$k}]; 
   if ( $#tmp > $deepest ) { 
    $deepest = $#tmp; 
   } 
   push @attackerpath, [@tmp]; 
    } 
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 # print "Simulate sending and marking packets\n"; 
 for $j ( 0 .. $deepest ) { 
  @tmp2 = (); 
  for $i ( 0 .. 3 ) { 
   $tmp2[$i] = [()]; 
  } 
  $marked_hash[$j] = [@tmp2]; 
 } 
 if ( $probabilistic ) { 
  for ( $i=0; $i <= $#attackerpath; $i++ ) { 
   $path = $attackerpath[$i]; 
   # print "simulating path @{$path}\n"; 
   for ( $k = 0; $k < $num_pack; $k++ ) { 
    $marked = 0; 
    $depth = 0; 
    for ( $j = $#{$path}; $j >= 1; $j-- ) {   
                if ( rand() < $markprob ) { 
      $marked = 1; 
      $depth = $j; 
      $ip = $path->[$j]; 
     } 
    } 
    if ( $marked == 1 ) { 
     # The packet was marked 
     $ipnum = $ip; 
     $frag = int(rand( 4 )); 
     if ( $frag == 4 ) { $frag = 3; } 
     $hash = MD5_8bitv1( $ipnum, $frag ); 
     if ( $depth > 1 ) { 
      $ipnumf = $path->[$depth - 1]; 
      $hashf = MD5_8bitv2( $ipnumf, $frag ); 
      $hash = $hash ^ $hashf; 
     } 
     $mharr = $marked_hash[$depth][$frag]; 
     # Only add it if it is not yet in it 
     $found = 0; 
     for $m ( 0 .. $#{$mharr} ) { 
      if ( $mharr->[$m] == $hash ) { 
       $found = 1; 
       last; 
      } 
     } 
     if ( $found == 0 ) { 
      # print "Added a sample\n"; 
      push @{$mharr}, $hash; 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } else { 
  # deterministic marking 
  for ( $i=0; $i <= $#attackerpath; $i++ ) { 
    $path = $attackerpath[$i]; 
    for ( $j = $#{$path}; $j >= 1; $j-- ){$ipnum = $path->[$j]; 
    for $frag ( 0 .. 3 ) { 
     $hash = MD5_8bitv1( $ipnum, $frag ); 
     if ( $j > 1 ) { 
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      $ipnumf = $path->[$j - 1]; 
      $hashf = MD5_8bitv2( $ipnumf, $frag ); 
      $hash = $hash ^ $hashf; 
     } 
     $mharr = $marked_hash[$j][$frag]; 
     # Only add it if it is not yet in it 
     $found = 0; 
     for $m ( 0 .. $#{$mharr} ) { 
      if ( $mharr->[$m] == $hash ) { 
       $found = 1; 
       last; 
      } 
     } 
     if ( $found == 0 ) { 
      push @{$mharr}, $hash; 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 # print "Done simulating\n"; 
 
 # print "Computing routers_at_depth\n"; 
 @routers_at_depth_num = (); 
 @routers_at_depth_list = (); 
 for ( $i=0; $i <= $deepest; $i++ ) { 
  %tmp = (); 
  $routers_at_depth_list[$i] = {%tmp}; 
 } 
 compute_routers_at_depth( $victim, 0 ); 
 # print "Routers at depth:\n"; 
 for $i ( 0 .. $#routers_at_depth_num ) { 
  # print "  $i: $routers_at_depth_num[$i]\n"; 
 } 
 
# start analyzing 
 $start_time = time(); 
 $suspected_set[0] = [($victim)]; 
 for $depth ( 1 .. $deepest ) { 
  $suspected_set[$depth] = [()] ; 
 
  for $susp ( @{ $suspected_set[$depth-1] } ) { 
   if ( ! exists $neighbor{ $susp } ) { 
    $s =  $susp ; 
    die "$s has no neigbors\n"; 
   } 
   $neigh = $neighbor{$susp}; 
    for $n ( @{$neigh} ) { 
    $matches = 0; 
    for $frag ( 0 .. 3 ) { 
     $neighhash = MD5_8bitv1( $n, $frag );  
   if ( $depth > 1 ) { 
     $susphash = MD5_8bitv2( $susp, $frag );  
           $neighhash = $neighhash ^ $susphash; 
     } 
               @tmp = grep {$_ == $neighhash}      
                                        @{$marked_hash[$depth][$frag]}; 
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     if ( $#tmp >= 0 ) { 
      $matches++; 
     } 
    } 
    if ( $matches > $match_threshold ) { 
    @tmp = grep {$_ == $n} @{$suspected_set[$depth]}; 
     if ( $#tmp < 0 ) { 
      push @{$suspected_set[$depth]}, $n; 
     #$tmp =  $n ; 
     #print "Found a suspect at level $depth:$tmp\n;  
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 $end_time = time(); 
 # print "Analyzing results\n"; 
 $fp = $fn = 0; 
 for $i ( 1 .. $deepest ) { 
  $fp[$i] = 0; 
  $fn[$i] = 0; 
  $susp = $suspected_set[$i]; 
  $rout = $routers_at_depth_list[$i]; 
  for $j ( 0 .. $#{$susp} ) { 
   if ( exists $rout->{ $susp->[$j] } ) { 
    delete $rout->{ $susp->[$j] }; 
   } else { 
    # $k = ipnum2str( $susp->[$j] ); 
    # print "False positive at level $i: $k\n"; 
    $fp[$i]++; 
    $fp++; 
   } 
  } 
  foreach $j ( keys %{$rout} ) { 
   # $k = ipnum2str( $j ); 
   # print "False negative at level $i: $k\n"; 
   $fn[$i]++; 
   $fn++; 
  } 
 } 
#   print "Number of false positives:\n"; 
#   for $i ( 1 .. $deepest ) { 
#    print "   $i: $fp[$i]\n"; 
#   } 
#   print "Number of false negatives:\n"; 
#   for $i ( 1 .. $deepest ) { 
#    print "   $i: $fn[$i]\n"; 
#   } 
   $delta_t = $end_time - $start_time; 
#   print "The analysis took $delta_t seconds\n"; 









#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch 
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }             




@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); 
bootstrap Crypt::MD5; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n"; 
 
package FAST; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 






  my $hash; 
  $MD5->reset(); 
  $MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]); 
  $hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % 16; 
  return $hash; 
} 
 
 sub round  
{ 
    my($number) = shift; 





@line=<FILE>;                  
chop @line; 
@Fid =(); @Mark=(); 
for ($i=0;$i<=$#line;$i++) 
{#print" line $i--------------------"; 
 @record=();$j=0; 
 @recordit = split /\s/, $line[$i]; 
  for($k=0;$k<=$#recordit;$k++) 
   { 
    if($recordit[$k] ne $recordit[$k+1]) 
     { 
      $record[$j]=$recordit[$k];if($j ne 0) { print FILE1 "$record[$j] ";}   
      $j++; 
     } 
   } 
 for($pkt=0;$pkt<$NUMPACKETS;$pkt++) 
   {$dummy=rand(rand(rand(rand(time())))); 
    srand($dummy ^ $$); 
    $Marking[$pkt]='';$fid=round(rand(3)); 
    #print"Pkt =$pkt\n";  
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     for($j=1;$j<=$#record;$j++) 
      { 
       $Marking[$pkt]=$Marking[$pkt].hash($record[$j],$fid).'.'; 
      }$cnt=-1;#print "Marking $Marking[$pkt]\n"; 
        for($p=0;$p<=$#Mark;$p++) 
         {#print "$Marking[$pkt] eq $Mark[$p] and $fid eq $Fid[$p]\n"; 
          if($Marking[$pkt] eq $Mark[$p] and $fid eq 
$Fid[$p]){$p=$#Mark+1;}else {$cnt =$cnt+1;} 
         }     
          if($cnt eq 
$#Mark){push(@Mark,$Marking[$pkt]);push(@Fid,$fid);}#print"Mark @Mark\n Fid 
@Fid\n";} 
            
    } 




1;    
***************************************************************************** 
 




BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }             




@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); 
bootstrap Crypt::MD5; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n"; 
 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
%MD5hasher = (); 




  my $hash; 
  $MD5->reset(); 
  $MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]); 
  $hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % 16; 
  return $hash; 
} 
 open(File,"FASTNoRep.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n"; 
 @line1=<File>; chop @line1;    
for($r=0;$r<$#line1;$r++)  
   { 
    @arr= split /\s/, $line1[$r];@harr0=();@harr1=();@harr2=();@harr3=(); 
    for($i=0;$i<=$#arr;$i++) 
    {  
     push @harr0,hash($arr[$i],0);#print "rr= @harr0\n"; 
     push @harr1,hash($arr[$i],1); 
     push @harr2,hash($arr[$i],2); 
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     push @harr3,hash($arr[$i],3);  
    }  
   push @hsec0,[@harr0];#print "sec $hsec0[$r]->[1]\n"; 
   push @hsec1,[@harr1]; 
   push @hsec2,[@harr2]; 










  { 
   @Marks=(); 
   @Marks = split /\./, $FAST::Mark[$i];#print"Marks @Marks\n"; 
   for($hid=0;$hid<=$#line1;$hid++) 
    { 
     $p=$#{$Table[$FAST::Fid[$i]]->[$hid]}; 
     if($#Marks <= $p) 
     { 
      $cnt=-1; 
      for($j=0;$j<=$#Marks;$j++) 
       { 
       if($Marks[$j] ne ($Table[$FAST::Fid[$i]]->[$hid])->[$j+1]) 
        { 
           $j=$#Marks+1; 
        }      
       else{$cnt=$cnt+1;} 
       } 
     if($cnt eq $#Marks){  
                        print "$line1[$hid]\n"; 
                         } 
    } 

























  if($val[$i] eq $val[$j] and $val[$i] ne ' ') 
   { 
    $cnt=$cnt+1;$val[$j]=' '; 
   } 
 }$dummy=0; 
  if($cnt >= $m) 
   {print"R $val[$i]\n"; 
    $Recon=$Recon+1; 
    for($k=0;$k<=$#path;$k++) 
     { 
    #  print "$val[$i] eq $path[$k]\n"; 
        @first=split /\s/,$val[$i];@sec=split /\s/,$path[$k];$node=$val[$i];  
     # if($val[$i] eq $path[$k]) 
        if($#sec eq $#first)       
        {$b=-1; 
         for($n=0;$n<=$#sec;$n++) 
         { 
           if($first[$n] eq $sec[$n]) 
            {# print "$first[$n] eq $sec[$n]\n"; 
              $b=$b+1; 
            } 
          } 
          if($b eq $#sec) {$k=$#path+1;}# print "ATT $node \n";} 
           else {$dummy=$dummy+1;} 
          } 
         else {$dummy = $dummy+1;}#print "Dum =$dummy\n";} 
       } 
     if($dummy eq $#path+1){$fp=$fp+1;} 
  } 
} 
$end=time(); 
$Time = $end-$start; 
print"False Positives $fp\n"; 



















#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch 
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }             







@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); 
bootstrap Crypt::MD5; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n"; 
 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
%MD5hasher = (); 
 
$victim = 27; 
$p=.25; 
@test=(100); 
open(File,"05.ASNpath.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n"; 
open(File3,"Topology.dat"); 
open(File1,"031.IPpaths.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n"; 
#open(File,"temp.dat");open(File1,"temp1.dat");open(File2,"temp2.dat"); 
open(File2,"zcat HIT.dat.gz |")|| die "Could not open AS topology file 1\n"; 
      
@line=<File>; chop @line; 
@line1=<File1>; chop @line1; 
@line2=<File2>; chop @line2; 
@line3=<File3>; chop @line3; 
 
#Toplology of AS 
#for($k=0;$k<$#line;$k++) 
#{ 
# @records=split /\s/,$line[$k]; 
# push(@attacker,$records[$#records]); 
# for($j=1;$j<=$#records;$j++) 
#  { 
#   if((grep{$_ == $records[$j]}@topology) eq 
0){push(@topology,$records[$j]);} 
#  }   
#}      
@topology=split /\s/,$line3[0]; 
 
#Main Program       
for $v (@test) 





#$Fn = $#attackpath-($#Rep-$Fp); 
#$Rt=$end-$start; 
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print" $v\n.....\nFP = $Fp\n";print" FN $Fn\n"; 







  my $hash; 
  $MD5->reset(); 
  $MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]); 
  $hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**$_[2]); 




{my $k;my @record=(); 
 for($k=0;$k<=$#_;$k++) 
  { 
   if($_[$k] ne $_[$k+1]) 
     { 
       push(@record,$_[$k]); 
     } 













  $r=int(rand(125000));@recordAS=();@recordIP=(); 
  @recordAS=split /\s/,$line[$r];print "line $i\n";print 
"@recordAS\n";push(@ActAS,@recordAS);@attackpath=Norep(sort(@ActAS)); 
  @recordIP=split /\s/,$line1[$r];print 
"@recordIP\n";push(@ActIPs,@recordIP);@ActIP=Norep(sort(@ActIPs)); 
 for($pkt=0;$pkt<=500;$pkt++) 
  { 
   @Pks=();$d=0; 
   for($j=$#recordAS;$j>=0;$j--) 
   { 
     $cnt=-1; 
     $r=rand(1); 
     $hid=int(rand(4)); 
     if($r < .01) 
      {$flag=0;$temp=$recordAS[$j];if((grep{$_ == $recordAS[$j]}@attackpath) 
eq 0){push(@attackpath,$recordAS[$j]);}}#print"This is AS marking 
$recordAS[$j]\n";} 
     else{if($r<.04 and $r > .01){$flag=1;$temp=$recordIP[$j];}}#print"This 
is IP marking]\n";} 
          # print "Num of Nodes $#Nodes\n"; 
    } 
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         for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++) 
          {#print"$Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,13) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] 
eq $hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag\n"; 
          if($Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,13) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] eq 
$hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag){}else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}#print"cnt=$cnt\n node- 
$#node 
          } 
          if($cnt == $#Nodes) 
          {@Pks=(); 
           push(@Pks,hash($temp,$hid,13),$hid,$flag); push 
@Nodes,[@Pks];#print"@Pks\n"; 
          } 













 if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 0) 
 { 
  @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],13)  eq $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@topology; 








  @Cnt=grep{$_ == $s[$t]}@s; 
   if($#Cnt>=1) 
    {  
      if((grep{$_ == $Cnt[0]}@Rep) eq 0) 
      { 
       push(@Rep,$Cnt[0]); 
      } 
    } 
}     
print"The attack originating ASes\n@Rep\n"; 




 @records=split /\s/,$line2[$k]; 
 @recordsIP=split /\s/,$line1[$k]; 
 for($s=0;$s<=$#records;$s++) 
  { 
   if((grep{$_ == $records[$s]}@Rep) ne 0) 
    { 
     $cnt=$cnt+1; 
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     } 
  } 
 if($cnt==$#records){push (@IP,@recordsIP);push @count, 
[@recordsIP];}#print"recordIP = @records\n";} 
} 
print "\nNumber of paths in IP topology $#count\n"; 
#Remove Repetitions in IP\n 
 
@out1=Norep(sort(@IP)); 





 if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 1) 
 {  
  @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],13) == $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@out1;#print"Sys 
@Sys\n"; 







  @Cnt=grep{$_ eq $s[$t]}@s; 
   if($#Cnt>=1) 
    {  
      if((grep{$_ eq $Cnt[0]}@Suspect) eq 0) 
      { 
       push(@Suspect,$Cnt[0]); 
      } 





print"Calculating the number of False Positives\n"; 
for($l=0;$l<=$#ActIP;$l++) 
{ 





print"\nAttackers in the suspected set \n @Pre\n"; 
print"\nActual Attack graph\n @ActIP\n"; 
$Fn=$#ActIP-$#Pre; 
$Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP;print 
print "\nFalse Negatives $Fn\nFalse Positives $Fp"; 










#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch 
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }             





@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); 
bootstrap Crypt::MD5; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n"; 
 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
%MD5hasher = (); 
 
$victim = 27; 
$p=.25; 
@test=(50,150,250,500,1000); 
open(File,"05.ASNpath.dat") || die "Could not open AS file 1\n"; 
open(File3,"Topology.dat"); 
open(File1,"031.IPpaths.dat") || die "Could not open IP file 1\n"; 
#open(File,"temp.dat"); 
#open(File1,"temp1.dat");open(File2,"temp2.dat"); 
open(File2,"zcat HIT.dat.gz |")|| die "Could not open AS topology file 1\n"; 
      
@line=<File>; chop @line; 
@line1=<File1>; chop @line1; 




#Toplology of AS 
#for($k=0;$k<$#line2;$k++) 
#{@records=(); 
# @records=split /\s/,$line2[$k]; 
# push(@attacker,$records[$#records]); 
# for($j=0;$j<=$#records;$j++) 
#  { 
#   if((grep{$_ == $records[$j]}@topology) eq 
0){push(@topology,$records[$j]);} 
#  }   




#Main Program       
for $v (@test) 






#$Fn = $#attackpath-($#Rep-$Fp); 
#$Rt=$end-$start; 
print" $v\n.....\nFP = $Fp\n";print" FN $Fn\n"; 







  my $hash; 
  $MD5->reset(); 
  $MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]); 
  $hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**$_[2]); 






{my $k;my @record=(); 
 for($k=0;$k<=$#_;$k++) 
  { 
   if($_[$k] ne $_[$k+1]) 
     { 
       push(@record,$_[$k]); 
     } 








 my $i; 
 for($i=0;$i<25;$i++) 
 { 
  my $k=0;$t=0;$s=0; 
  while($t<=$#count) 
    {$we=index($IPd[$i][$t],'.'); 
    if($IPd[$i][$t] ne '#' and $we > 1) 
    {  
    for ($j=$t;$j<$#count;$j++)   
      {  
      if ($IPd[$i][$t] eq $IPd[$i][$j+1] && $IPd[$i][$j+1] ne '#' ) 
           { 
             $IPd[$i][$j+1]= '#'; 
           } 
      } 
 
    $OrderedIP[$i][$s]=$IPd[$i][$t];print"Ordered $OrderedIP[$i][$s]\n"; 
    $countIP[$i]++; 
    $s++; 
   } 
      $t++; 
  } 
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  $r=int(rand(125000));@recordAS=();@recordIP=(); 
  @recordAS=split /\s/,$line[$r];print "line $i\n";print 
"@recordAS\n";push(@ActAS,@recordAS);@attackpath=Norep(sort(@ActAS)); 
  @recordIP=split /\s/,$line1[$r];print 
"@recordIP\n";push(@ActIPs,@recordIP);@ActIP=Norep(sort(@ActIPs)); 
 for($pkt=0;$pkt<=1000;$pkt++) 
  { 
   @Pks=();$d=0; 
   for($j=$#recordAS;$j>=0;$j--) 
   { 
     $cnt=-1; 
     $r=rand(1); 
     $hid=int(rand(4)); 
     if($r < .01) {$flag=0;$temp=$recordAS[$j];$d=0;} 
 
     if($r < .04 and $r >= .01){$flag=1;$temp=$recordIP[$j];$d=0;}#print"This 
is IP marking]\n";} 
          # print "Num of Nodes $#Nodes\n"; 
     if($r >= .04){$d=$d+1;}   
  } 
         for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++) 
          {#print"$Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] 
eq $hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq $d\n"; 
          if($Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] eq 
$hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq 
$d){}else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}#print"cnt=$cnt\n node- $#node 
          } 
          if($cnt == $#Nodes) 
          {@Pks=(); 
           push(@Pks,hash($temp,$hid,12),$hid,$flag,$d); push 
@Nodes,[@Pks];#print"@Pks\n"; 
          } 













 if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 0) 
 { 
  @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) eq $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@topology; 








  @Cnt=grep{$_ == $s[$t]}@s; 
   if($#Cnt>=2) 
    {  
      if((grep{$_ == $Cnt[0]}@Rep) eq 0) 
      { 
       push(@Rep,$Cnt[0]); 
      } 
    } 
}     
print"The attack originating ASes\n@Rep\n"; 
*****************************************************************************     
 




 @records=split /\s/,$line2[$k]; 
 @recordsIP=split /\s/,$line1[$k]; 
 for($s=0;$s<=$#records;$s++) 
  { 
   if((grep{$_ == $records[$s]}@Rep) ne 0) 
    { 
     $cnt=$cnt+1; 
     } 
  } 
 if($cnt==$#records) 
  {push @count, [@recordsIP]; 
   for($dist=0;$dist<=$#recordsIP;$dist++) 
   {  
     $IPd[$dist][$pos]= $recordsIP[$dist];print "$IPd[$dist][$pos]\n"; #$$ 
push (@IP,@recordsIP); print"recordIP = @records\n"; 
   }  






print "\nNumber of paths in IP topology $#count\n"; 
#Remove Repetitions in IP\n 
 
#@out1=Norep(sort(@IP)); 









 if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 1) 
 {  
  for($IPcnt=0;$IPcnt<$countIP[$Nodes[$q]->[3]];$IPcnt++) 
   {#print"d= $Nodes[$q]->[3]  hash($OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]-
>[3]][$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)",hash($OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]-
>[3]][$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)," == $Nodes[$q]->[0]\n"; 
    if(hash($OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]->[3]][$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) == 
$Nodes[$q]->[0]) 
     { 
      # @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) == $Nodes[$q]-
>[0]}@out1;#print"Sys @Sys\n";push(@s,@Sys); 
       push(@s,$OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]->[3]][$IPcnt]);#print"Entered\n" 
     } 








  @Cnt=grep{$_ eq $s[$t]}@s; 
   if($#Cnt>=2) 
    {  
      if((grep{$_ eq $Cnt[0]}@Suspect) eq 0) 
      { 
       push(@Suspect,$Cnt[0]); 
      } 





print"Calculating the number of False Positives\n"; 
for($l=0;$l<=$#ActIP;$l++) 
{ 





print"\nAttackers in the suspected set\n @Pre - $#Pre\n"; 
print"\nActual Attack graph\n @ActIP - $#ActIP\n"; 
$Fn=$#ActIP-$#Pre; 
$Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP; 










#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch 
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }             





@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); 
bootstrap Crypt::MD5; 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n"; 
 
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5; 





#open(File,"05.ASNpath.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n"; 
#open(File3,"Topology.dat"); 
#open(File1,"031.IPpaths.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n"; 
open(File,"temp.dat"); 
open(File1,"temp1.dat");open(File2,"temp2.dat"); 
#open(File2,"zcat HIT.dat.gz |")|| die "Could not open AS topology file 1\n"; 
      
@line=<File>; chop @line; 
@line1=<File1>; chop @line1; 




#Toplology of AS 
for($k=0;$k<$#line2;$k++) 
{@records=(); 
 @records=split /\s/,$line2[$k]; 
 push(@attacker,$records[$#records]); 
 for($j=0;$j<=$#records;$j++) 
  { 
   if((grep{$_ == $records[$j]}@topology) eq 
0){push(@topology,$records[$j]);} 
  }   




#Main Program       
for $v (@test) 





#$Fn = $#attackpath-($#Rep-$Fp); 
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#$Rt=$end-$start; 
print" $v\n.....\nFP = $Fp\n";print" FN $Fn\n"; 







  my $hash; 
  $MD5->reset(); 
  $MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]); 
  $hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**$_[2]); 





{my $k;my @record=(); 
 for($k=0;$k<=$#_;$k++) 
  { 
   if($_[$k] ne $_[$k+1]) 
     { 
       push(@record,$_[$k]); 
     } 







 my $i; 
 for($i=0;$i<25;$i++) 
 { 
  my $k=0;$t=0;$s=0; 
  while($t<=$#count) 
    {$we=index($IPd[$i][$t],'.'); 
    if($IPd[$i][$t] ne '#' and $we > 1) 
    {  
    for ($j=$t;$j<$#count;$j++)   
      {  
      if ($IPd[$i][$t] eq $IPd[$i][$j+1] && $IPd[$i][$j+1] ne '#' ) 
           { 
             $IPd[$i][$j+1]= '#'; 
           } 
      } 
 
    $OrderedIP[$i][$s]=$IPd[$i][$t];#print"Ordered $OrderedIP[$i][$s]\n"; 
    $countIP[$i]++; 
    $s++; 
   } 
      $t++; 
  } 








sub compute_routers_at_depth { 
        my ( $vip, $distance ) = @_; # vip = victim ip, prev = next hop 
        my $i = 0; 
        my $att; 
        my $curdepth = $routers_at_depth_list[$distance]; 
           
        if ( $distance > $deepest ) { 
                print "Ups - something is wrong $distance $vip\n"; 
        } 
        if ( ! exists $curdepth->{$vip} ){  
                $curdepth->{$vip} = 0; 
                $routers_at_depth_num[$distance]++; 
        } 
        if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip } ) { 
                # We are at the leaf 
                # print "  Leaf\n"; 
        } else { 
                # look through all the attackers 
                $att = $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip }; 
                # Recurse 
                for ( $i=0; $i <= $#{$att}; $i++ ) { 
                        compute_routers_at_depth( $att->[$i], $distance + 1 
); 
                } 














  $r=int(rand(100));@recordAS=();@recordIP=(); 
  @recordAS=split /\s/,$line[$r];#print "line $i\n";print "@recordAS\n"; 
  push(@ActAS,@recordAS);@attackpath=Norep(sort(@ActAS)); 
  @recordIP=split /\s/,$line1[$r];#print "@recordIP\n"; 
  push(@ActIPs,@recordIP);@ActIP=Norep(sort(@ActIPs)); 
 for($pkt=0;$pkt<=300;$pkt++) 
  { 
   @Pks=();$d=0; 
   for($j=$#recordAS;$j>=0;$j--) 
   { 
     $cnt=-1; 
     $r=rand(1); 
     $hid=int(rand(4)); 
     if($r < .01) {$flag=0;$temp=$recordAS[$j];$d=0;} 
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     if($r < .04 and $r >= .01){$flag=1;$temp=$recordIP[$j];$d=0;}#print"This 
is IP marking]\n";} 
          # print "Num of Nodes $#Nodes\n"; 
     if($r >= .04){$d=$d+1;}   
  } 
         for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++) 
          {#print"$Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] 
eq $hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq $d\n"; 
          if($Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] eq 
$hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq 
$d){}else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}#print"cnt=$cnt\n node- $#node 
          } 
          if($cnt == $#Nodes) 
          {@Pks=(); 
           push(@Pks,hash($temp,$hid,12),$hid,$flag,$d); push 
@Nodes,[@Pks];#print"@Pks\n"; 
          } 












 if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 0) 
 { 
  @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) eq $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@topology; 








  @Cnt=grep{$_ == $s[$t]}@s; 
   if($#Cnt>=2) 
    {  
      if((grep{$_ == $Cnt[0]}@Rep) eq 0) 
      { 
       push(@Rep,$Cnt[0]); 
      } 
    } 
}     
print"The attack originating ASes\n@Rep\n"; 
**************************************************************************** 
 
$pos=0; %attacknodes = (); 
 $deepest = -1; 
 %attackercount=(); 





  @records=split /\s/,$line2[$j]; 
  @recordsIP=split /\s/,$line1[$j]; 
 for($s=0;$s<=$#records;$s++) 
  { 
   if((grep{$_ == $records[$s]}@Rep) ne 0) 
    { 
     $cnt=$cnt+1; 
     } 
  } 
 @tmp=(); 
  if($cnt == $#records) 
  { 
    $k =[@recordsIP];print"@recordsIP\m"; 
     $adjust = 0; 
          for ( $i=0; $i < $#{$k}; $i++ ) { 
                  if ( $k->[$i] ne $k->[$i+1] ) { 
                     push @tmp, $k->[$i]; 
           if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} ) { 
               $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i] } = [($k->[$i+1])]; 
                 $attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1] } = 1; 
                   }  
     else { 
      @tmp2 = grep{$_ eq $k->[$i+1]}@{$attacknodes{$i - $adjust, $k->[$i] }}; 
              if ( $#tmp2 < 0 ) { 
                push @{ $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} }, $k->[$i+1]; 
                  $attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]} = 1; 
                  } else { 
                    $attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]}++; 
                          } 
                   } 
                 } else { 
                          $adjust++; 
                         } 
          } 
          push @tmp, $k->[$#{$k}]; 
         $att1=$attacknodes{0,$victim}; 
         print"att1",$att1->[0],"\n"; 
 
          if ( $#tmp > $deepest ) {   
                  $deepest = $#tmp;print"deepest - $deepest\n"; 
          } 
          push @IPtopology, [@tmp]; 
  } 
} 
 
 print "Computing routers_at_depth\n"; 
        @routers_at_depth_num = (); 
        @routers_at_depth_list = (); 
        for ( $i=0; $i <= $deepest; $i++ ) { 
                %tmp = (); 
                $routers_at_depth_list[$i] = {%tmp}; 
        } 
        compute_routers_at_depth( $victim, 0 ); 
         print "Routers at depth:\n";$all_routers=0; 
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        for $i ( 0 .. $#routers_at_depth_num ) 
{$all_routers=$all_routers+$routers_at_depth_num[$i]; 
                print "  $i: $routers_at_depth_num[$i]\n"; 
              } 
       $att1=$attacknodes{0,$victim}; 
        print"att1",$att1->[0],"\n"; 
      print "Coun $all_routers\n";  
      
     @Arr=();$t=0;$n=1;$k=1; 
       push(@Arr,$victim);$vip=$victim; 
       
      for($i=0;$i<$all_routers;$i++) 
        { 
          if($k eq 0){$k=$routers_at_depth_num[$n];$n=$n+1;$t=$t+1;} 
            $arr1=$attacknodes{$t,$vip}; 
            for($rp=0;$rp<=$#{$arr1};$rp++) 
             { 
              push(@Arr,$arr1->[$rp]);#print "Arr @Arr"; 
             } 
            $k=$k-1; 
           $vip=$Arr[$i+1] 
        } 





  for($cnt=$first;$cnt<$last;$cnt++) 
  { 
   push(@A,$Arr[$cnt]); 
  } 
  push @DistArr,[@A];print"A @A"; 
  $first=$last; 







 if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 1) 
 {  
  for($IPcnt=0;$IPcnt<=$#{$DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]};$IPcnt++) 
   {print"d= $Nodes[$q]->[3]  hash(",$DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]-
>[$IPcnt],",$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)",hash($DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]-
>[$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)," == $Nodes[$q]->[0]\n"; 
    if(hash($DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]->[$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) == 
$Nodes[$q]->[0]) 
     { 
      # @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) == $Nodes[$q]-
>[0]}@out1;#print"Sys @Sys\n";push(@s,@Sys); 
       push(@s,$DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]->[$IPcnt]);#print"Entered\n" 
     } 









  @Cnt=grep{$_ eq $s[$t]}@s; 
   if($#Cnt>=2) 
    {  
      if((grep{$_ eq $Cnt[0]}@Suspect) eq 0) 
      { 
       push(@Suspect,$Cnt[0]); 
      } 





print"Calculating the number of False Positives\n"; 
for($l=0;$l<=$#ActIP;$l++) 
{ 





print"\nAttackers in the suspected set present in actual attack graph\n @Pre 
- $#Pre\n"; 
print"\nActual Attack graph\n @ActIP - $#ActIP\n"; 
$Fn=$#ActIP-$#Pre;print "\nFn=$#ActIP-$#Pre\n"; 
$Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP;print"Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP\n"; 
 print "\nFalse Negatives $Fn\nFalse Positives $Fp"; 
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